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The most common reason for Nonsuicidal Self-Injury (NSSI) is to reduce distress 
(Klonsky, 2007), yet it is unclear why people decid to use NSSI to reduce distress on a 
specific occasion. This study tested separate stepsof a decision making model (adapted 
from Janis & Mann, 1977) about using NSSI to reduce distress. College students who 
have previously self-injured were administered 14-2 daily online questionnaires about 
coping behavior and decisions. Results supported each step of the model and indicated 
that NSSI was more likely when someone is more distres ed, less hopeful to find another 
coping behavior, and can find solitude, amongst other findings. These results highlight 
potential areas of clinical intervention including specific cognitions to modify and 
improving social support. This study should be improved and replicated in future 
research. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the study of Nonsuicidal Self Injury (NSSI), there is an empirically based 
consensus that the primary reason for engaging in NSSI is to reduce or remove distress 
from affective or cognitive states (Klonsky, 2007). Although this primary function is 
generally agreed upon in the field, it is still unclear what the specific antecedents of NSSI 
are. Moreover, it is unclear what cognitive and behavioral processes are involved in the 
decision to use NSSI to alleviate distress. Nock, Prinstein, and Sterba (2009, p. 817) state 
that "Very little is known about … what factors predict the transition from self-injurious 
thoughts to self-injurious behaviors...” The aim of this study is to identify what decisional 
processes are involved in an act of NSSI. This study focused on those individuals who 
already have used NSSI to reduce distress and will not seek to explain why people use 
NSSI initially or why some continue to use it and others do not. 
Definition 
NSSI is the direct and deliberate destruction of one’s external body tissue 
occurring in the absence of certain or ambivalent intent to die, developmental disorders, 
psychosis, and socially accepted practices. NSSI includes, but is not limited to, cutting, 
carving, hitting, banging body parts on surfaces, striking oneself, severe scratching, 
interference with wound healing, pulling out hair, skin picking, sticking sharp objects 
(e.g., needles) into flesh, burning (e.g., with cigarettes or flames), and pinching (Nock & 
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Prinstein, 2004). Inherent in the definition of NSSI is that it is “deliberate,” thus leaving 
out any self-harming behavior that is done outside of conscious awareness such as 
singular hair pulling, skin picking, fingernail biting, or wound healing interference. NSSI 
does not involve repetitive and/or stereotyped behavior like that observed in 
developmental disorders such as Mental Retardation nd Autistic Disorder (Jacobson & 
Gould, 2007). It also does not include severe bodily injury such as eye-enoculation, 
castration, and limb amputation that may occur in psychotic disorders or during psychotic 
episodes (Suyemoto, 1998). NSSI has also been distiguished from body modifications 
(e.g., piercings, tattoos) that are often times considered socially acceptable (Nock & 
Mendes, 2008; Suyemoto, 1998), and from indirect forms of self-harm (e.g., overdosing 
on medication, consuming poison) that are ambiguous and uncertain in their level of self-
injury and are often times purposeful or ambivalent suicide attempts (Favazza & 
Rosenthal, 1993; Jacobson & Gould, 2007).  
Incidence 
Lifetime rates of NSSI are surprisingly high in adolescent and college 
populations. The rates of NSSI in college populations have been fairly well established. 
In a sample of 2,875 undergraduate and graduate stud nts from two northeastern 
universities, Whitlock, Eckenrode, and Silverman (2006) found that 17% had engaged in 
NSSI at some time in their lives. Other smaller studies have found lifetime rates around 
25% (Brown, 2009; Brown, Williams, & Collins, 2007; Glenn & Klonsky, 2009; 
Klosnky & Olino, 2008). Four other studies conducted at the same college (University of 
Massachusetts) found lifetime rates of NSSI in college students ranged from 35 to 44% 
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(Gratz, 2001; Gratz & Chapman, 2007; Gratz, Conrad, & Roemer, 2002; Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004). A similar rate has been found in a Southeast Asian sample - Treson, Ito, 
and Mearns (2012) collected data from 307 Indonesia college students and found 38% 
to engage in NSSI in their lifetimes. In the largest study to date, 15.3% of 11,529 
randomly selected students across eight American universities in the Northeaset and 
Midwest had engaged in NSSI at least once in their liv s (Whitlock et al., 2012). All 
together, the lifetime incidence rates of NSSI in college students are surprisingly high 
with a broad range from 15-44%. 
Adolescent samples usually show comparable rates to college samples. In a study 
of 440 community adolescents in two high schools, it was found that 13.9% of students 
between grades 7 and 11 had engaged in NSSI at least once in their lives (Ross & Heath, 
2002). Another study of 1,393 students from a Midwestern United States high school 
found that 21.4% had performed NSSI sometime in their liv s (Muehlenkamp, Williams, 
Gutierrez, & Claes, 2009). A study of 665 9th graders from the United States and 
Germany found that 16.1% of American students and 20.5% of German students engaged 
in NSSI in their lives (no significant difference; Plener, Libal, Keller, Fegert, & 
Muehlenkamp, 2009). Cerutti, Manca, Presaghi, and Gratz (2010) found 41.9% of their 
sample of 234 Italian adolescents to engage in lifetime NSSI. A sample of 1,663 Swedish 
high school students from 17 schools endorsed a lifetime rate of 17.1% (Lanstedt & 
Gadin, 2010). Studies with smaller samples of community adolescents have found NSSI 
lifetime rates to be generally high and in the 30% to 47% range (Claes, Houben, 
Vandereycken, Bijttebier, & Muehlenkamp, 2009; Lloyd-Richardson., Perrine, Dierker, 
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& Kelley, 2007). Taken together these studies demonstrate high variability across 
samples with prevalence rates from 14% to 47%. These rates are similar between 
America and Europe and are consistent with those found in college samples. 
 Studies of NSSI incidence in adult samples are scarce nd usually 
methodologically flawed. For example, a study by Klonsky, Oltmanns, and Turkheimer 
(2003) found 4% of a large military population to have used NSSI in their lives. These 
authors only assessed NSSI with two items from a larger personality measure. Similarly, 
Briere and Gil (1998) assessed a stratified random sa ple of 927 adults (mean age 46) in 
the United States and found that 4% had engaged in NSSI in the past six months. These 
authors also used a measure of convenience which only included one item assessing 
NSSI. In the only high-quality study of the adult incidence of NSSI to date, Klonsky 
(2011) used a random-digit telephone dialing procedur  with 439 American adults to 
assess the lifetime rate of NSSI. Klonsky found 5.9% of the anonymous responders to 
engage in NSSI in their lives. Overall, it appears that less than 10% of American adults 
have engaged in NSSI, but that number should be expcted to rise as generations of self-
injuring adolescents become adults.  
Reasons for NSSI 
 Studies examining the reasons for using NSSI have det rmined that reducing 
negative emotional states is the most commonly report d reason for NSSI (Klonsky, 
2007). Nock and Prinstein (2004, 2005) found two different samples of inpatient 
adolescents to endorse this reason at a higher rate than to increase a feeling state (to feel 
“real” or “alive”), escape or decrease a social situation (e.g., get out of an argument), or 
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to gain social rewards (e.g., care or attention). In these studies, Nock and Prinstein used a 
newly developed questionnaire that included question  directly asking participants about 
why they had used NSSI. In a large sample of college students, Whitlock et al. (2012) 
found 80.9% of participants to have used NSSI to regulate negative affect. Similarly, 
other authors using self-report of reasons have found that 53-100% of those using NSSI 
do so to relieve negative affect (Heath, Ross, Toste, Charlebois, & Nececheva, 2009; 
Kemperman, Russ, & Shearin, 1997; Kleindeinst et al., 2008; Klonsky, 2009; Klonsky, 
2011; Nixon, Cloutie, & Aggarwai, 2002; Nock & Prinstein, 2004). 
 Other self-report studies have investigated participants’ emotional states prior to 
and after NSSI. These studies are limited by their retrospective nature and rely on 
participants to recall how they were feeling before and after a specific episode of NSSI or 
multiple acts of NSSI; however, they provide furthe evidence that people commonly 
engage in NSSI to reduce negative affect. For example, Kamphuis, Ruyling, and 
Reijntnes (2007) mailed a questionnaire to Dutch women in a “self-harm support group” 
asking them to identify a recent act of NSSI and repo t whether or not they were 
experiencing certain positive or negative emotions (anger, depression, fatigue, tension 
and vigor) immediately before (i.e., baseline), immediately after, and one day after a 
specific NSSI act. These authors found that depression, anger, tension, and fatigue 
significantly decreased from before to after NSSI, while vigor significantly increased. All 
emotions returned to baseline one day later, except tension which remained significantly 
lower than it was at baseline. Significantly more participants showed a reduction in 
tension from right before to right after NSSI in comparison to the other emotions.  
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A study using similar methodology as Kampuis et al. (2007) and involving female 
inpatients with Borderline PD found significant effects with a decrease in negative affect 
(collapsed across different affects) and an increase in positive affect (collapsed) from 
immediately before to immediately after retrospectively recalled acts of NSSI. By 
calculating the slopes the authors found anger, anxiety, “upset”, and “overwhelmed” to 
decrease the most and peaceful to increase the most (Kemperman et al., 1997). In another 
study, Kleindeinst and colleagues (2008) found significant reductions in tension, 
pressure, emptiness, loneliness, depression, dejection, sadness, anger, disgust, numbness, 
unreal, and mortification from before to after retrospectively recalled acts of NSSI. 
Unexpectedly, there were significant increases in feeling ashamed, which may be a 
consequent emotion of NSSI in addition to the relief of other negative states. Similarly, 
Chapman and Dixon-Gordon (2007) asked female inmates to identify a past act of NSSI 
and report their emotions before and after the act. Combining several emotions (anger, 
anxiety, tension, guilt, relief, calmness, etc.) it was found that 55% of participants 
experienced a “positive shift” in emotions from immediately before to immediately after 
NSSI.  
 The best evidence to support reduction of negative emotions as a primary reason 
for NSSI is from experimental studies. In one such study, Brain, Haines, and Williams 
(1998) used participants with a history of NSSI andcreated personalized scripts for the 
participants based on interviews. These included script  for an act of NSSI, an accidental 
act of self-injury, an angry social interaction, and a low arousing event (e.g., making 
coffee). Each script included four stages: 1) scene setting/description, 2) approach to the 
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action (e.g., self-injury), 3) the actual action, ad 4) the immediate consequence of the 
action. As participants were read to, and visualized their scripts, they were monitored 
with physiological equipment measuring heart rate, respiration, and skin conductance. 
Additionally, they rated their emotional state on polarized dimensions (relaxed/tense, 
relaxed/anxious, calm/angry, unafraid/afraid, happy/sad, normal/unreal, and 
relieved/uptight) using visual analogue scales for each stage of the script after each script 
was finished (i.e., after an entire script was read, they recalled what they felt like during 
each stage of that script).  
On the NSSI script, participants had an increase in all physiological measures 
between stage one (setting the scene) and stage two (approach). The physiological 
measures all decreased between stage two and stage three (action) and that level was 
maintained to stage four (consequence). This was in contrast to the other scripts where 
physiological indices either remained low throughout (neutral script) or increased from 
stage one to three and then decreased from stage three to four (accidental injury and 
angry social interaction scripts). In other words, imagining NSSI seemed to reduce 
physiological arousal, whereas imagining arguing and ccidental injury increased arousal. 
With regard to self-reported emotions, during the NSSI script the majority of emotions (5 
of 7: relaxed/tense, relaxed/anxious, calm/angry, happy/sad, normal/unreal) changed in 
the direction of more distress from stage one to stage wo, stayed high from stage two to 
stage three, and then decreased from stage three to four. Once again, this pattern was 
unique to the NSSI imagery script. The authors highlight that there was a lag between the 
reduction in physiological measures and the reduction in self-reported affect with the 
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physiological measures decreasing during the NSSI stage (stage three) and the self-
reported emotions decreasing during the consequence stag  (stage four). They concluded 
from their results that the reduction in physiological arousal is the actual reinforcing 
mechanism of NSSI. The authors then divided the participants into recent (within last 12 
months) and past (at least 12 months prior) self-injurers and found that the lag between 
physiological and subjective measures only existed for past self-injurers. The authors 
then concluded that people tend to cognitively reinterpret the effect of NSSI after they 
stop using it. Alternatively stated, when people ar using NSSI they view it as an emotion 
regulation strategy that works immediately and so their self-report of affect reduction 
tends to coincide with their reduction in physiological arousal.  
 In a previous study using the same methodology as above, Haines, Williams, 
Brain, and Wilson (1995) examined personalized scripts with prisoners who have used 
NSSI. Script by stage interactions were significant for all subjective emotions and 
followed the same pattern as the Brain and colleagus (1998) study where physiological 
arousal stayed at a low level for the neutral script, increased from stage one to three and 
then decreased at stage four for the accident and angry interaction scripts, and increased 
from stage one to two and then decreased at stage thre  for the NSSI script. Once again, 
there was a lag between physiological and subjectiv measures on the NSSI scripts with 
the subjective ratings of emotions reducing after imagining the NSSI (stage 3), although 
the authors did not divide the participants by recency of NSSI to see if this explained the 
lag.  
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 In one of the only two ecological momentary sampling studies of NSSI to date, 
Nock et al. (2009) followed 30 community adolescents who had recently used NSSI. 
These participants kept personal digital assistants (PDAs) that randomly prompted them 
twice a day to complete questions about self-injurious thoughts and behaviors. 
Additionally, participants were asked to self-initiate an entry if they had a “self-
destructive thought or behavior.” Reducing negative experiences (including negative 
emotions as well as cues to negative emotions such as t oughts and memories) was 
provided as a reason for 64.7% of the NSSI episodes. Of these instances, the specific 
reasons cited were to escape anxiety on 34.8% of occasions, sadness on 24.2% of 
occasions, anger on 19.7% of occasions, a bad thought n 28.8% of occasions, and a bad 
memory on 13.6% of occasions.  
Armey, Crowther, and Miller (2011) used similar methodology over a period of 
one week with a sample of 36 college students. Participants completed assessments 
regarding affect (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994) and NSSI behavior on palm pilots 
six times a day and after any use of NSSI. Latent growth curve analyses of affect before, 
during, and after NSSI events indicated a significant quadratic slope for the PANAS-X 
Negative Affect scale and Guilt scale. An item level analysis also showed a significant 
slope for the Anger item. Each slope indicated thate emotion increased prior to NSSI, 
peaked during NSSI, and decreased after NSSI. This study provided further evidence that 
NSSI successfully reduces negative emotions. 
Feeling generation has been endorsed with moderate frequency in samples as a 
reason for NSSI, but at a lower rate than to reduce negative emotions. Nock and Prinstein 
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(2004) found feeling generation reasons including “to punish yourself,” “to feel relaxed,” 
and “to feel something, even if it was pain” to be endorsed at a significantly lower rate 
than negative emotion reduction reasons, but at a higher rate than social reasons. Several 
of the studies above that examined changes in negativ  affect also found changes in 
positive affect (increasing vigor, calm, relaxed, relieved, and peaceful). This includes 
both retrospective report (Chapman & Dixon-Gordon, 2007; Kamphuis et al., 2007; 
Kemperman et al., 1997; Kleindeinst et al., 2008; Klonsky, 2009) and experimental 
studies (Brain et al., 1998; Haines et al., 1995).  In addition, an ecological momentary 
sampling study of NSSI found that approximately 25% of NSSI instances were done for 
feeling generation reasons (Nock et al., 2009).  
Some studies have examined specific reasons that fall under the category of 
feeling generation including self-punishment and increasing a sense of reality 
(alternatively stated as reducing dissociation). For example, a study involving a large 
sample of college students found that 47.6% engage in NSSI to punish themselves (Heath 
et al., 2009). In a study of women with BPD, Kleindeinst et al. (2008) found 12% to 
endorse self-punishment as their reason for NSSI during a six-month interval. Whitlock 
et al. (2012) found their large college sample to report self-punishment (24.7%) and 
physiological stimulation (24.1%) as reasons for using NSSI. Klonsky (2009) found 54% 
of a sample of college students to endorse “expressing anger at self” as their secondary 
reason for engaging in NSSI, although only 15% rated it as a primary reason for NSSI. 
Another study by Klonsky (2011) found in a large adult American sample that 36% used 
NSSI “to feel something because you were feeling numb or empty” and 32% doing so to 
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“punish yourself.” Support for the dissociation reduction reason comes from an 
ecological momentary sampling study, where Nock et al. (2009) found moments of 
feeling numb/nothing were predictive of instances of NSSI.  
Regardless of whether the reported reason for NSSI is to reduce negative affect, 
reduce dissociation, or self-punish, the majority of people engage in NSSI to reduce 
distress. This distress may be in the form of anxiety, sadness, anger, or other negatively 
valenced emotions. This reduction in negative affect may also result in increases in other 
feelings such as calmness, relaxation, or relief. The distress may also be due to a 
dissociative experience from which a person wants relief. Finally, the distress may be due 
to a sense of guilt or frustration that would be all viated with self-punishment (Chapman, 
Gratz, & Brown 2006). Collectively, reasons for increasing a feeling state or reducing a 
negative emotion have the shared capacity to reduce istr ss. The distinction between 
feeling generation and reducing negative emotions is somewhat arbitrary as both work 
via reductions in distress. It is helpful to consider them together as a way to regulate 
distress. The remainder of this paper refers to both reasons collectively with the term 
“distress regulation.” 
NSSI and Coping 
Although there is ample evidence that most instances of NSSI occur in order to 
relieve distress, it seems that this is typically not the preferred method of distress 
reduction. In support of this notion, Klonsky and Glenn (2008) conducted a study 
examining what adaptive strategies people have used to prevent an occurrence of NSSI 
after having an urge to engage in NSSI. They found that 89.7% of their college sample 
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had tried to resist NSSI urges in the past and endorse  an average of 16 different methods 
of avoiding using NSSI. The most common methods were “keeping busy” endorsed by 
82.4% of the sample, “being around friends” by 80%, “talking to someone about how you 
feel” by 74.3%, and “writing about how you feel” by74.3%. Four of the next five most 
common reasons (each endorsed by 59% or more of thesample) involved interacting 
with or thinking about others. Participants also rated how helpful the methods were in 
ending the urge for NSSI on a scale including “very helpful,” “somewhat helpful,” and 
“not at all helpful.” The most common “very helpful” methods were sports or exercise 
endorsed by 65.2%, removing means/instrument by 63.6%, finding someone who is 
understanding by 60.9%, and turning to religion/spirituality by 50%. On average, 
participants reported successfully resisting 85% of the time when using a “very helpful” 
method and 52% of the time when using a “somewhat helpful” method. These results 
provide evidence that most of the time when people have the urge to self-harm, they are 
able to successfully select a strategy to overcome the temptation.  
It is still unclear in the literature what circumstances result in failing to use a 
distress regulation strategy other than NSSI. Bennum and Phil (1983) examined what 
circumstances lead to NSSI, but relied on unstructued interviews conducted by the first 
author. They surmised that for 70% of the sample, NSSI was the result of a chain of 
events. A study by Nock et al. (2009) did not find any activity such as socializing, 
resting, recreational activities, and eating to be significant predictors of a NSSI thought in 
daily life. Furthermore, these authors only found that being alone was a significant 
predictor of NSSI. 
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Another study by Nock, Holmberg, Photos, and Michel (2007) used a new 
structured interview to ask adolescents about the nature of their NSSI. In this study, 
participants rated on an average of 0-4 how much certain stressors (family, friends, 
relationships, peers, work/school, mental state) were antecedents to their NSSI. The 
average for all items was fairly low and between 1 and 2, with the exception of “mental 
state” which had a high average of 3.4. These results ggest that no specific stressor is 
important to NSSI, but rather it is the end state of distress that is the main precipitant of 
NSSI.  
Taken together, there appears to be no specific stresso  that results in the urge to 
use NSSI or the actual use of NSSI. Aside from specific reasons in the environment, one 
explanation for why people fail to regulate their distress and resort to NSSI is that of ego 
depletion. Ego depletion is the concept that all volitional abilities including self-
regulation are drawn from the same limited bank of inner resources (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). In the case of NSSI, someone may become 
distressed and consequently put forth effort in regulating their emotions and behavior. 
This effortful self-regulation of distress may cause ego depletion that limits the ability to 
search for or use an alternative method to NSSI, which ultimately leads to NSSI because 
it is familiar and hence an easy idea to generate.  Furthermore, other methods of distress 
reduction may require more work (e.g., locating another person and initiating a 
conversation) or be less effective. In other words, people may just be too distressed to 
fight off the powerful urge to use NSSI. 
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The above research also highlights the fact that most people using NSSI would 
prefer not to use it. In further support of this idea, a study of adolescents who have used 
NSSI found 78.8% to report a reason to stop engagin in NSSI (Deliberto & Nock, 2008). 
Of these participants, 56.1% said it was an unhealty behavior, 17.1% said NSSI attracts 
attention, 14.6% said it results in scarring, 7.3% said it causes shame, and 4.9% stated 
that NSSI upsets family and friends. This research suggests that when people use NSSI 
they have made a decision to relieve their unwanted distress at the expense of potential 
long-term costs (e.g., scarring, negative self-image, deteriorating relationships). It 
appears that despite good reasons to not engage in NSSI many still do so, likely because 
of NSSI’s ability to quickly and effectively reduce distress. 
Some studies have examined the differences in coping strategy preferences 
between those who use NSSI and those who have neverused it. Findings are generally 
inconsistent for whether or not those using NSSI use le s adaptive coping strategies than 
controls; however, one finding that has been consistent is that those using NSSI report 
more avoidance strategies than those not using NSSI. Brown et al. (2007) divided college 
students into three groups: 1) never used NSSI, 2) used NSSI before the previous 12 
months, but not in the previous 12 months (past NSSI), and 3) used NSSI in the past 12 
months (current NSSI). These participants were administered a self-report of coping 
mechanisms (COPE; Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). Of the fifteen different coping 
strategies, only two were significant, with behavioral disengagement being higher in both 
NSSI groups and substance use being higher in the past NSSI group compared to the 
control group. One of the strategies (behavioral disengagement) that was higher in the 
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NSSI groups is by definition an avoidance strategy and the other (substance use) is often 
considered to be an avoidance strategy (Hayes, Wilson, Strosahl, Gifford, & Follette, 
1996). 
Andover, Pepper, and Gibb (2007) compared college students with and without a 
lifetime history of NSSI on a self-report of coping strategies (Coping Strategy Inventory; 
Amirkhan, 1990) that had three factors including problem solving, seeking social support, 
and avoidance. Consistent with the above study by Brown et al. (2007), those who had 
used NSSI reported using more avoidance, and also les  social support. Williams and 
Hasking (2010) examined young adults who have used NSSI on self-reports of coping 
strategies including the COPE and the Emotion Regulation Scale (Gross & John, 2003). 
They used a continuous measure of NSSI based on frequency, recency, and severity and 
weighted by number of methods. Increased NSSI was positively and significantly 
correlated with emotional suppression from the Emotion Regulation Scale and avoidant 
coping from the COPE. NSSI was also negatively correlated with more adaptive types of 
coping such as emotional reappraisal from the Emotion Regulation Scale and the problem 
focused coping and emotion focused coping scales from the COPE.  
A study by Hasking, Momeni, Swannell, & Chia (2008) also found differences in 
avoidance, but unlike the aforementioned studies, also found several differences in other 
types of coping. In this study, the authors examined s lf-report of coping mechanisms 
(COPE) between young adults who had never used NSSI, used “mild” NSSI, or used 
“moderate/severe” NSSI. The mild and moderate/severe groups were based on frequency, 
recency, severity, and weighted by the number of different methods where mild NSSI 
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was characterized by consistently low severity and infrequent NSSI. By using the higher-
order scales from the COPE (emotion-focused, problem-focused, avoidant), the 
moderate/severe group had lower emotion focused, and higher avoidant coping than 
controls. The mild NSSI group also had greater avoidant coping than controls. For the 
lower order factors, the moderate/severe NSSI group had lower positive reinterpretations, 
seeking social support for instrumental reasons, active oping, seeking social support for 
emotional reasons, and higher mental disengagement, d ial, behavioral disengagement, 
and substance use than controls. The mild NSSI group had lower active coping and 
higher behavioral disengagement and substance use than controls. Although this study 
replicated the other studies in that the NSSI groups used more avoidant coping techniques 
(mental disengagement, denial, behavioral disengagement, substance use, avoidant 
coping), they also used less adaptive coping techniques (e.g., seeking social support).  
Finally, a study by Haines and Williams (2003) essentially found null results with 
regard to differences in coping. These authors compared prisoners with a lifetime history 
of NSSI, prisoner controls, and college student conrols and found only one group 
difference among 14 scales from two self-report measures of coping strategies. The 
prison NSSI group was lower than the other two on cgnitive reinterpretation.  
Taken together, these studies on coping and NSSI demonstrate that those who use 
NSSI usually do not want to use NSSI and are typically successful in finding a way to 
prevent themselves from engaging in NSSI after theyhave to the urge to do so. 
Additionally, those using NSSI are more prone to using avoidance techniques (e.g., 
suppressing emotions, physically avoiding problem situations) in reaction to stressors. 
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This is not surprising as NSSI has been argued to be a type of experiential avoidance 
(Chapman et al., 2006). Experiential avoidance occurs when “a person is unwilling to 
remain in contact with particular private experiencs (e.g., bodily sensations, emotions, 
thoughts, memories, behavioral predispositions) and t kes steps to alter the form or 
frequency of these events and the contexts that occsion them (Hayes et al., 1996). Given 
that NSSI is usually engaged in to escape distressing feelings (or an absence of feelings), 
it appears to be a type of experiential avoidance te hnique. 
Solitude 
The literature so far has demonstrated that those who use NSSI typically do so to 
reduce distress and that when trying to reduce distres , alternative methods that may be 
more adaptive and socially acceptable are usually attempted first. Moreover, it has been 
shown that those who report a history of NSSI have a greater predilection towards 
avoidant coping strategies than those who have never used NSSI, which is not surprising 
as NSSI fits the definition of an experiential avoidance technique. Another factor that has 
been consistently demonstrated to be important for engaging in NSSI is solitude. Nock et 
al. (2009) used ecological momentary sampling with adolescents using NSSI and found 
that being alone was a significant predictor of future NSSI acts. A study of adolescents 
from either an inpatient psychiatric unit or acute partial hospitalization program found 
that 95.2% of the sample engaged in NSSI when alone (Nixon et al., 2002). In a small 
study of undergraduates using NSSI at least once in the r lives, 17.4% reported using 
NSSI in front of friends or with them and 4.3% reported doing it as part of a group 
(Heath et al., 2009). Although the percentage of thse using NSSI in solitude was not 
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reported, these first two rates suggest that the majority of participants have only engaged 
in NSSI when alone. Furthermore, Glenn and Klonsky (2009) found 54.5% of their 
sample to report always engaging in NSSI alone and 33.8% to report sometimes doing it 
alone with the limitation being that the response options were limited to always alone, 
sometimes alone, and never alone during NSSI. Lastly, Whitlock et al. (2012) found in 
their large college student sample that 63.7% “always injure[s] in private” and 8.8% 
“sometimes injure[s] in the presence of others.” Overall, it appears that people most often 
find solitude when engaging in NSSI. 
Janis and Mann’s Model of Decision Making under Stress 
The above review has demonstrated that those who use NSSI typically do so to 
reduce distress, after attempting an alternative coping strategy for their distress, and when 
alone. The review also highlighted that individuals with a history of using NSSI are more 
likely to use avoidant coping strategies in comparison to those who have never used 
NSSI. Janis and Mann (1977) created a model to explain decision making under distress, 
which Janis (1982) then further refined (Figure 1). This model may help to explain how 
one moves from an urge to engage in NSSI to actually sing NSSI. 
The model delineated by Janis and Mann (1977) and Jis (1982) presumes that 
decision making is compromised under distress and that this decision making process 
involves discrete steps that are assumed to occur rapidly (in seconds or minutes) and in a 
specified sequence: 1) the person appraises whether or not there is an imminent danger, 
2) they determine if there is an effective coping strategy readily available, 3) if no 
obvious strategy is available, then they determine if there may be an effective coping 
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strategy that they have not identified yet, and 4) they determine if they have enough time 
to search for an effective coping strategy.  
In Janis and Mann’s (1977) model, someone first appraises whether or not there is 
danger before moving on to subsequent steps. It should be mentioned here that when 
applied to the behavior of NSSI, the “danger” consists of further enduring emotional 
distress (Figure 2). When faced with the decision to use NSSI to regulate distress, people 
are not concerned about imminent physical danger, but rather the possibility of having to 
endure their distress any longer. People who use NSSI may come to the conclusion that 
they can no longer tolerate their emotional distres and this constitutes determining the 
presence of “danger.”  
In stage two of the model, a person assesses whether or not there is an effective 
coping strategy for the danger that is readily avail ble. This process involves searching 
one’s memory to determine if there is something that has worked in the past. Given the 
evidence on alternative coping strategies and NSSI, it is presumed that although a person 
remembers NSSI working in the past, they will most likely attempt to think of another 
strategy. If a person identifies an effective coping strategy (other than NSSI) and is able 
to use it, then they will; otherwise, they will move onto a third stage. In this third stage of 
decision making where no effective coping strategy (other than NSSI) was immediately 
identified, the person must decide if there is “hope” for finding an effective strategy. 
Janis and Mann (1977) postulate that at this point a person will ask themselves “Is it 
realistic to hope to find a better means of escape?” (p. 57). This subjective assessment of 
hope depends on one’s appraisal of external social resources (i.e., others who can advise 
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them) and internal resources (i.e., intellectual abilities). In some situations, people may 
not immediately identify an effective coping strategy and then decide that there is no 
hope of finding an effective strategy through external or internal resources.  
If someone decides there is no hope, then Janis and M n (1977) theorize that the 
person will engage in an experiential avoidance technique. Given that the person is 
already aware of the potential of NSSI as an experiential avoidance technique, it is 
assumed that the person would resort to this specific technique after deciding that there is 
no hope of finding an alternative. This is the first of two possible pathways to deciding to 
use NSSI; the second occurs later as a potential result of the decision made in step four of 
the model. Alternatively, if the person still has hope of finding an effective strategy other 
than NSSI, then the person will move on to step four and determine if there is sufficient 
time to find an effective coping strategy. The decision made in step four results in the 
person engaging in either good or bad search strategies. These good and bad search 
strategies are known as vigilance and hypervigilance, respectively.  
 If a person determines at step four that there is “insufficient time” to search for a 
strategy, then a state of hypervigilance occurs. More specifically, a person at step four is 
expected to quickly evaluate “Is there sufficient time to make a careful search for and 
evaluation of information and advice?” (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 59). “Insufficient time” 
is therefore a subjective “belief” about whether or n t there is time available, given the 
impending danger (in this case, ongoing distress), to appropriately and fully search for an 
effective coping strategy. This feeling of insufficient time is expected to be intensified 
when the danger is more salient. In this case, a feeling of “insufficient time” is likely a 
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function of level of distress (i.e., as distress increases, so does the likelihood of feeling 
there is insufficient time).  
Hypervigilance, which is the result of deciding there is “insufficient time” to 
search for an effective strategy, is characterized by a frantic and disorganized search for 
and appraisal of coping options and a phenomenon knwn as “premature closure.” 
Premature closure involves coming to a decision withou  considering or appropriately 
appraising all relevant information and appropriately considering the outcomes and long-
term consequences. Janis (1982) explains that during the decision process, stress impairs 
attention and perception and results in cognitive rigidity. This cognitive rigidity is 
characterized by a narrowing of alternatives and the tendency to overlook long-term 
consequences of choices. This cognitive rigidity ofen results in premature closure, which 
for the person familiar with NSSI, is likely to result in using NSSI. In other words, a 
person in distress who has used NSSI before to reduce istress may decide to search for 
another strategy, engage in a poor quality and frantic search, and end up resorting to 
NSSI despite their initial wishes not to. This is the second pathway to NSSI. 
If, on the other hand, the person feels that they have sufficient time to find a good 
coping strategy, then they will enter a state of vigilance. In a state of vigilance, a person 
feels that they have the necessary time to carry out a thorough search strategy. A person 
in a state of vigilance will engage in a thorough and ppropriate search for coping 
strategies followed by a careful evaluation of optins and a selection of the (presumably) 
best coping strategy available. It should be reiterated that when this model is applied to 
NSSI there are two pathways that may lead to NSSI. One pathway involves the decision 
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that there is no hope for a good coping strategy and the other involves a state of low 
quality hypervigilant searching as the result of a decision that there is not enough time to 
search for an effective coping strategy other than NSSI.  
The Janis and Mann (1977) model is applicable to the behavior of NSSI. Given 
that most instances of NSSI are in the service of rducing distress, the Janis and Mann 
model is helpful because it applies to situations made under the condition of distress. 
Furthermore, it appears that people who have used NSSI in the past attempt to identify 
another effective coping strategy to end their distress rather than use NSSI (Deliberto & 
Nock, 2008; Klonsky & Glenn, 2008). Most often, they are successful, but sometimes 
they are unable to effectively find or use another strategy and they resort to NSSI to 
reduce their distress. A new model specifically applying the Janis and Mann theory of 
decision making to the behavior of NSSI is depicted in Figure 2.  
NSSI Model of Decision Making Under Distress 
The updated model in Figure 2 is similar to the original Janis and Mann (1977) 
model depicted in Figure 1 with some notable differences. The first step of the updated 
model involves experiencing heightened emotional distress, and thus an urge to engage in 
NSSI. According to previous research on the reasons for using NSSI, most instances of 
NSSI are done in order to reduce distress. Therefore, when someone is in a state of 
distress they will most likely consider using NSSI as way to reduce that distress. Rather 
than making an assessment that “danger is imminent” as Janis and Mann’s original model 
begins, this model involves a decision that distres is too high to endure. The second, 
third and fourth steps are nearly identical to those f the Janis and Mann model. In the 
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updated model shown in Figure 2, notice that there are two paths that lead to the decision 
to use NSSI. One is through subjectively determining that there is no “hope” of finding 
an alternative effective strategy based on an assessment of internal and external 
resources. Janis and Mann said that at this point people engage in an avoidance 
technique, which in this case is NSSI. The other pathw y to the decision to use NSSI is 
through a subjective belief that there is “insufficient time” to appropriately search for an 
effective alternative to NSSI. Finally, an extra and fifth step was added to the model for 
NSSI where after a person decides that they will engage in NSSI, they must find solitude 
to do so. If they are successful in finding solitude, then they will engage in NSSI. 
However, if they are unsuccessful at finding solitude, then they will endure the distress 
and not use NSSI. 
Goal 
The goal of this study was to determine the validity of the NSSI model of decision 
making under distress provided above. This goal was accomplished by separate analyses 
for each of the steps in the model (Figure 2). Thus, the entire model was not analyzed, 
but rather its component parts were analyzed.  
Hypotheses 
1. Consistent with step one of the model, increased daily emotional distress will 
predict looking for an effective coping strategy. For this study, the variable of 
“effort” in looking for a strategy is used. 
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2. Since heightened emotional distress should eventually result in a greater 
likelihood of engaging in NSSI, higher daily emotional distress will be associated 
with a greater likelihood of NSSI. 
3. Consistent with step two of the model, less time looking for a coping strategy 
(i.e., having one readily available) will be associated with using a strategy other 
than NSSI. Research on NSSI shows that people who use NSSI prefer not to; 
therefore, it is hypothesized that if people choose a coping strategy immediately 
and use it, then it will be something other than NSSI. 
4. Consistent with step three of the model, lower perceived “hope of finding an 
effective technique” will significantly predict increased occurrences of decision to 
engage in NSSI.  
5. In support of step four of the model, a higher subjective rating of “sufficient time 
to search for an effective search strategy” will be associated with higher vigilance. 
6. Also consistent with step four of the model, a lower subjective rating of vigilance 
will significantly predict increased occurrences of decision to engage in NSSI.  
7. The decision to engage in NSSI will predict increased effort in trying to isolate 
oneself. 
8. Given the literature on solitude and NSSI as well as step five of the model, 
actually isolating oneself will predict use of NSSI. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Participants 
 In order to recruit participants with a recent history of NSSI, the Functional 
Assessment of Self-Mutilation (described below; FASM; Lloyd, Kelley, & Hope, 1997) 
was administered during the Fall and Spring Mass Screening in the Psychology 
Department at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG) in the 2010-2011 
and 2011-2012 school years. Participants endorsing any type of NSSI in the past year 
were contacted by e-mail and offered to take part in a study on daily experiences of mood 
regulation in exchange for credit towards their General Psychology research requirement. 
In addition, two participants were recruited from the UNCG Psychology Clinic based on 
therapist endorsement of past NSSI. These “clinic participants” were given money in 
exchange for participation. 
One hundred thirty-nine participants were enrolled in the study. Of these, 53 
indicated on the FASM completed in the lab that they did not self-injure during the past 
year (one was a clinic participant), contrary to what they had reported on the FASM in 
mass screening or what their therapist had reported. This left 86 participants who were 
eligible to continue the study after the lab session. Ineligible participants continued the 
study and completed online surveys per UNCG Internal Review Board agreement, but 
their data were not used in analyses. Additionally, the daily data from these 53
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individuals were examined and they did not endorse daily use of NSSI for any of the 
accumulated 700 surveys completed. There were no differences between those 
confirming NSSI past year on the laboratory FASM and those who did not on gender, 
t(137) = -.99 (ns); age, t( 137) = 1.45 (ns); family income, t(137) = -1.08 (ns); or ethnicity 
F(132, 5) = 2.16, ns. 
 Of the remaining 86 eligible participants, 83 completed at least one daily 
questionnaire and were used in analyses. 78.3% (n = 65) were female. Ages ranged from 
17 to 31 (M = 19.02, SD = 2.31). Most participants were Caucasian (71%, n = 59), 
followed by African American (18.1%, n = 15), Latino (3.6%, n = 3), and Interracial 
(7.2%, n = 6). The family incomes ranged broadly from the lowest ($0-$10,000) to 
highest ($100,000+) intervals. The median income range reported was $50,001 - $60,000 
and the mean was approximately $50,001 - $60,000 as well. The standard deviation was 
approximately 3 intervals of $10,000. The one clini participant included in analyses was 
not markedly different from other participants as she was a Caucasian female college 
student. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of the FASM and the daily questionnaire 
(described below) variables. Table 2 displays the frequency of endorsement for each 
coping behavior on the daily survey for the whole analysis sample (n = 1109 surveys).  
 Nineteen participants indicated using NSSI for anyreason on at least one of their 
daily surveys with a mean of 2.05 days of NSSI use (SD = 1.13; see Figure 3 for 
distribution). There appeared to be a trend toward less NSSI occurring over the course of 
the online portion of the study for participants, although this was not tested for 
significance (see Figure 4). Twelve participants reported using NSSI specifically for 
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coping on at least one daily survey. There were no differences between the 19 that used 
NSSI during the study and the 64 that did not on age, t(81) = -.17 (ns); gender, t(81) = - 
.08 (ns); income, t(81) = .78 (ns); or ethnicity, F(77, 5) = 2.03, (ns). In addition to 
examining demographic differences, HLM was used to see if those using NSSI during the 
study were different than others on any of the daily survey variables (discussed below). 
The same multi-level modeling structure used in the hypothesis tests was applied to these 
preliminary analyses. Results indicated that those using NSSI during the study had more 
overall distress, γ(85)  = 0.69 (SE = .20, p < .001), higher peak distress, γ(85)  = .11 (SE = 
.04, p < .01), used more effort in searching for a coping strategy, γ(85)  = .76 (SE = .24, p 
< .01), tried harder to isolate themselves to use a coping strategy, γ(85)  = 1.05 (SE = .25, 
p < .001), and were more likely to be alone when coping, γ(85)  = .89 (SE = .29, p < .01). 
Thus, it appears that those using NSSI in the study ha  more daily distress, tried harder to 
reduce this distress, and successfully tried harder to isolate themselves to cope with their 
distress. 
Materials 
 Demographic form. Basic demographic information was gathered including 
ethnicity, age, sex, and family income. 
Functional Assessment of Self-Mutilation. The Functional Assessment of Self-
Mutilation (FASM; Lloyd, Kelley, & Hope, 1997) is a self-report of specific NSSI 
behaviors used during the past year (Appendix A). For each of the twelve NSSI behaviors 
(e.g., burning oneself, cutting oneself) the respondent indicates whether or not they did it, 
how many times they did it, and whether or not they received medical treatment for the 
                  
 
28 
 
injury. The Functional Assessment of Self-Mutilation also has 23 items assessing the 
functions of NSSI (i.e., the reasons for NSSI). Good validity (content and convergent) 
and reliability (internal) have been demonstrated for this measure (Nock & Prinstein, 
2004, 2005). All items on this measure were generated from an extensive review of the 
literature on NSSI and from focus groups involving patient adolescents who had 
engaged in NSSI (Lloyd, Kelley, & Hope, 1997). The 23 items assessing functions have 
been found to have a four factor structure according to a confirmatory factor analysis: 
Automatic Positive Reinforcement, Automatic Negative Reinforcement, Social Positive 
Reinforcement, Social Negative Reinforcement (Nock & Prinstein, 1994). The Functional 
Assessment of Self-Mutilation has shown excellent co vergent validity with the Self-
Injurious Thoughts and Behavior Interview (Nock et al., 2007) with perfect agreement 
between presence of NSSI in the past year, and near-perfect agreement for frequency of 
NSSI in the past year (= .99; Nock et al., 2007).  
In order to make participants report of NSSI more consistent with the definition 
used in this study, some items were modified to clarify that the behavior was done with 
the intent of causing harm to oneself. All modificat ons are in parentheses in Appendix A. 
Additionally, the words “without the intent to kill yourself” were added to the 
instructions line and question fourteen. The item, “While doing any of the above acts, 
were you trying to kill yourself?” was removed. 
COPE. The COPE (Carver, Scheier, & Wintrauv, 1989) is a 60-item self-report 
of coping strategies. The measure contains fifteen scales with four items, each rated on a 
Likert-style scale from “I usually don’t do this at ll” to “I usually do this a lot.” The 
                  
 
29 
 
purpose of the COPE was to facilitate the deceptive cover story that the study is 
concerning several different types of coping strategies (i.e., not just NSSI).  
Daily questionnaire. In order to test the NSSI model of decision making u der 
distress, an experience sampling methodology approach w s used. Participants were sent 
an e-mail each day with a link to a survey for them to complete at the end of the day 
(Appendix C). Participants were also provided with a link at the beginning of the study in 
case there were technical difficulties with e-mail at any point. On this daily questionnaire, 
participants were first given a definition of distress and asked to “rank the overall degree 
to which you were distressed today” and “what was your highest level of distress today” 
on a seven-point Likert scale from “minimally” to “extremely.”  
The second item on the daily measure asked how hard t ey looked for a coping 
strategy to reduce their distress. This item assessed the effort that they put into looking 
for a strategy and was on a seven-point Likert scale from “not hard at all” to “very hard.” 
The third item assessed how hopeful they felt about finding a strategy to reduce their 
distress on a seven-point scale from “no hope at all” o “certain of finding a way.” The 
fourth question assessed the extent to which they felt they had sufficient time to search 
for a coping strategy. This question was also on a seven-point scale with anchors of “no 
time at all” and “as much time as I needed.” Questions three and four are modeled after 
Janis and Mann’s (1977) examples of what a person may ask themselves when deciding 
if there is hope and if there is sufficient time (“Is it realistic to hope to find a better means 
of escape?” and “Is there sufficient time to make a careful search for and evaluation of 
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information and advice?”). These items have been reworded to fit the daily questionnaire 
better and to not assume that the person wants to “escape” a particular situation.  
In order to assess whether the person engaged in vigilance or hypervigilance, 
question five asked  to what degree their search for a coping strategy was characterized 
by frantic and disorganized searching versus through and organized searching. This 
question is on a seven-point scale. The sixth and seventh questions both have the same 
response options, but ask the participant what methods of distress reduction they decided 
to use and actually used, respectively. The responses i clude adaptive and maladaptive 
methods such as NSSI, using alcohol or drugs, avoidnce, social support, and problem 
solving. The eighth question assessed how successful the method was at reducing distress 
on a seven-point scale from “not at all” to “very successful.” The ninth question assessed 
the time it took to identify the strategy actually used in minutes and hours while the tenth 
question asked about the person’s effort in trying to isolate themselves on a seven-point 
scale from “not at all” to “very hard.” The eleventh question assessed who the person was 
with when they used the coping strategy and included th  response options of alone, 
friend(s) or peer(s), family member(s), stranger(s), or other. Although not directly related 
to the hypotheses, question twelve assesses how close the respondent was to whom they 
were with on a seven-point scale from “not close at all” to “very close.” The thirteenth 
question assessed how much time passed between deciding to use a coping strategy and 
actually using it in hours and minutes. The fourteen h question assessed whether or not 
the person actually engaged in NSSI that day. If they responded yes, then they were 
asked what method was used (14a), based on a list tken from the modified Functional 
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Assessment of Self-Mutilation. They were also asked how successful NSSI was (if 
endorsed) in reducing their distress on a seven poit scale from “not at all” to “very 
successful” and how much they regretted it on a seven-point scale from “not at all” to 
“very much.” 
Procedure 
 The FASM was given to students enrolled in Introduction to Psychology at the 
beginning of the Fall and Spring semesters during the school years of 2010-2011 and 
2011-2012. Students endorsing any NSSI over the past ye r were sent an e-mail inviting 
them to the study. In the e-mail they were provided with a numerical code to sign up 
electronically for the experiment via the UNCG Psychology Department’s experiment 
website (Experimetrix). Participants from the UNCG Psychology Clinic were nominated 
by their therapists based on a history of NSSI. These clinic participants were then called 
by the student investigator and offered to participate in exchange for financial 
compensation.  
 All participants then attended an initial session in the lab where a research 
assistant provided informed consent, a demographic questionnaire, the COPE, and the 
FASM. In order to increase the specificity of identifying nonsuicidal self-injurers, any 
person not endorsing NSSI again in the lab was retained in the study, but their data was 
removed from all analyses. As part of the consent, participants were deceived and 
provided a cover story indicating that the study was about how people cope in different 
ways (i.e., not just NSSI) on a daily basis. Participants were then instructed to complete 
online questionnaires at the end of each day for the next 14 days. Finally, the participants 
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were provided with a web address to complete the questionnaire should they have any 
difficulty with their e-mail. 
 In order to improve response rates on the daily questionnaires, incentives were 
provided for completing these. Students were given two research credits for attending the 
initial session. They were given another credit for c mpleting five days of online 
questionnaires and a fourth credit for completing aother five days of online 
questionnaires (total of 10 days). Clinic participants were given $10 in cash for the 
laboratory visit and an additional $5 in cash for every five days of online questionnaires 
completed. All participants were entered into a drawing for one of 5 $25 gift cards to 
Target at the end of the semester if they completed all 14 days of questionnaires.  
 There was low recruitment during the first semester of the first year, which 
prompted some changes in methodology. One change was the inclusion of study 
participants from the UNCG Psychology Clinic, although only two participants were 
recruited in the study. Additionally, the length of the online portion of the study was 
extended to 21 days to increase the likelihood that the sample obtained would engage in 
NSSI during the study. This resulted in other changes in procedure including the 
possibility of obtaining a fifth credit for completing 15 days (total) of questionnaires and 
the requirement of completing all 21 days of questionnaires to be entered into the gift 
card drawing. Of the 83 participants included in the study, 32 completed the 14-day 
protocol and 51 completed the 21-day protocol. As expected, there was a difference 
between participants in mean number of surveys completed with those in the 21-day 
protocol completing more (M = 15.57, SD = 5.24) than those in the 14-day protocol (M = 
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9.75, SD = 3.30), t(81) = -5.62, p < .05. This difference indicates that the procedural 
change was helpful in collecting more data. All participants, regardless of involvement in 
the 14-day or-21 day procedure, were combined for all an lyses. A difference in number 
of surveys completed was anticipated and was accounted for by using multilevel 
modeling with Level 1 data group centered (i.e., centered within individuals). 
 In order to protect participants from imminent harm, their responses to online 
questionnaires were monitored by the principle investigator (Christopher Robertson). In 
particular, the “other” option for the daily items a sessing what methods they decided to 
use and actually used to reduce their distress (items 6 and 7, respectively) was monitored 
for suicidal content. There were no indications of uicide or other safety concerns during 
the study. 
Analyses 
 All of the hypotheses were assessed using multilevel modeling where daily 
question responses (Level 1) were nested within individual participants (Level 2 data). 
This multilevel analysis is considered standard for experience sampling methodology. 
Hypotheses two, three, four, six, and eight, had binary outcomes and could not be 
appropriately analyzed with a multilevel linear model. Therefore, a link function was 
used with HLM software (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2004) to transform the binary 
outcome variables into ratios so that these models could be analyzed using a linear 
model. The link function is: Prob(Dependent Variable = 1|Participantj) = Φij  log[Φij/(1 
- Φij)] = Transformed Dependent variable. 
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The first eight hypotheses involved the relationship between two Level 1 
variables. For the first hypothesis, multilevel modeling was used to examine the direct 
relationship between overall daily level of distress (item 1a on the daily questionnaire) 
and effort in looking for a coping strategy (item 2 on the daily questionnaire), and highest 
level of daily distress (item 1b) and effort in looking for a coping strategy (two separate 
analyses).  
 
Level 1: Yij = π0j + π1j* (Peak Distress or Overall Distress) + Eij 
Level 2: π0j = β00 + R0j 
Where: Yij = effort; Bold predictors are centered within participants 
Hypothesis two was tested with multilevel modeling to examine the relationship 
between overall and highest daily levels of distress (item 1a and 1b on the daily 
questionnaire, respectively; two separate analyses) and whether or not they engaged in 
NSSI (item 14; 1 = NSSI, 0 = any other response and not using NSSI).  
 
Level-1: ηij = π0j + π1j*(Peak Distress or Overall Distress) + Eij 
 
Level-2: π0j = β00 + R0j 
    π1j = β10 + R1j 
Where: Prob(NSSI Useij =1| πj) = Φij 
log[Φij/(1 - Φij)] = ηij 
In order to test the third hypothesis, the relationship between amount of time spent 
looking for a coping strategy (item 9 on the daily questionnaire) and using a coping 
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strategy other than NSSI (item 7; 0 = NSSI, 1 = any other response and not NSSI) was 
assessed using multilevel modeling. 
 
Level-1: ηij = π0j + π1j*( Time Looking for Strategy) + Eij 
 
Level-2: π0j = β00 + R0j 
    π1j = β10 + R1j 
Where: Prob(NSSI to Copeij =1| πj) = Φij 
log[Φij/(1 - Φij)] = ηij 
Hypothesis four was tested with multilevel modeling to examine the relationship 
between perceived hope over finding a coping strategy (item 3 on the daily questionnaire) 
and the dichotomous daily variable of decision to use NSSI (item 6 on the daily 
questionnaire; 1 = NSSI, 0 = any other response and not NSSI).  
 
Level-1: ηij = π0j + π1j*(Hope) + Eij 
 
Level-2: π0j = β00 + R0j 
    π1j = β10 + R1j 
Where: Prob(NSSI Decisionij =1| πj) = Φij 
log[Φij/(1 - Φij)] = ηij 
The relationship between perception of sufficient time to find a coping strategy 
(item 4 on the daily questionnaire) and increased hypervigilance (item 5 on the daily 
questionnaire) was assessed using multilevel modeling to test hypothesis five.  
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Level 1: Yij = π0j + π1j* (Sufficient Time) + Eij 
 
Level 2: π0j = β00 + R0j 
Where: Yij = Hypervigilance  
Multilevel modeling was used to test hypothesis six by examining the relationship 
between hypervigilance (item 5 on the daily questionnaire) and the dichotomous decision 
for NSSI variable (item 6 on the daily questionnaire).  
 
Level-1: ηij = π0j + π1j*(Hypervigilance) + Eij 
 
Level-2: π0j = β00 + R0j 
    π1j = β10 + R1j 
Where: Prob(NSSI Decisionij =1| πj) = Φij 
log[Φij/(1 - Φij)] = ηij 
In order to test hypothesis seven, multilevel modeling was used to assess the 
relationship between decision to engage in NSSI (dichotomized item 6 on the daily 
questionnaire) and effort in isolating oneself (item 10 on the daily questionnaire).  
 
Level 1: Yij = π0j + π1j* (NSSI Decision) + Eij 
 
Level 2: π0j = β00 + R0j 
Where: Yij = isolation effort 
Hypothesis eight was tested with multilevel modeling by examining the 
relationship between being alone (item 11 on the daily questionnaire; 1 = alone, 0 = any 
other response and not alone) and use of NSSI (dichotomized item 14). 
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Level-1: ηij = π0j + π1j*(Alone) + Eij 
Level-2: π0j = β00 + R0j 
    π1j = β10 + R1j 
Where: Prob(NSSI Useij =1| πj) = Φij 
log[Φij/(1 - Φij)] = ηij 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Assumption Tests 
 This first results section does not concern the actual hypothesis tests discussed 
above. Rather, this section reports the tests of the statistical assumptions of the multilevel 
model for each hypothesis test. This was done to determine if the model assumptions for 
the hypothesis tests were upheld or not. Models that met statistical assumptions were then 
analyzed and the results of these analyses are reported in the next section. 
 All hypotheses involved only Level 1 data and therefo e only required tests for 
Level 1 assumptions. The Level 1 assumptions are normality of error variances and 
independence of error terms with the predictors (independent variables). Hypotheses two, 
three, four, six and eight models have binary outcomes and the assumption of normality 
does not apply (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), and therefore was not assessed. Normality of 
error variances for the hypothesis one, five, and seven models was assessed by examining 
Q-Q plots and histograms of the error variances plotted against the normal curve. 
Independence of error terms with the predictors was tested for hypotheses one through 
eight. The independence assumption was assessed by examining scatter plots of the 
independent variables plotted against the corresponding Level 1 error variances for each 
model. Pearson correlations between the error variance nd the independent variable were 
then conducted for each model as an additional test of independence.
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 For the first test of the first hypothesis (daily overall distress predicting daily 
search effort) examination of the Q-Q plot and histogram indicated normally distributed 
error variances (Figures 5a and 5b). A scatter plot of the independent variable with the
error variances indicated a positive relationship (Figure 5c) that was confirmed with a 
Pearson correlation, r = .72, p < .001. Several data transformations of the independent 
variable (square root, inverse, natural log, log linear) were attempted to correct this 
violation with no success. As a result of this violation assumption, hypothesis one will 
not be assessed using overall distress as an indepent variable. 
For the second test of the first hypothesis (daily peak distress predicting search 
effort) the Q-Q plot appeared normal (Figure 6a). The histogram appeared normal 
(Figure 6b), but was kurtotic (kurtosis = 2.63, SE = .15). An inverse transformation of the 
dependent variable resulted in a normal distribution of error variances (kurtosis = .66, SE 
= .15). The scatter plot of the independent variable plotted against the corresponding 
model level 1 error variances indicated a null relationship (Figure 6c) that was also 
evidenced with a non-significant Pearson correlation, r = -.030, ns, demonstrating that the 
independent variable and the error were not related. The results of these tests indicate that 
the statistical assumptions were upheld after transforming the independent variable. 
 For the first test (daily overall distress predicting daily use of NSSI) of hypothesis 
two, an examination of the scatter plot of Level 1 rror variances plotted against the 
independent variable (overall distress) demonstrated independence (Figure 7). This was 
confirmed with a point-biserial correlation, rpb = .03, ns. The second test of hypothesis 
two (daily peak distress predicting daily use of NSSI) also showed a null relationship 
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with a scatterplot and point-biserial correlation, rpb = .02, ns (Figure 8). The independent 
variables were not related to their respective errors; therefore, statistical assumptions 
were upheld for both of the models testing hypothesis two.  
The models for hypotheses three and four met statistic l assumptions. The scatter 
plot of hypothesis three (time searching for coping strategy predicting daily use of NSSI) 
Level 1 error variances plotted against the independent variable showed independence 
(Figure 9). This was supported with a point-biserial correlation, rpb = -.002, ns.    Similar 
results were found for hypothesis four, rpb = -.02, ns (Figure 10).  These results indicate 
that statistical assumptions were upheld for the models for both hypotheses three and 
four. 
The Q-Q plot for the Level 1 model error variances of the fifth hypothesis 
(perception of insufficient time to find a coping strategy predicting frantic/hypervigilant 
searching) indicates a normal distribution of error variance (Figure 11a). The histogram 
also appears to be normally distributed (Figure 11b), although it is somewhat leptokurtic 
(kurtosis = 2.13). Several transformations of the dependent variable were conducted 
(square root, inverse, natural log, log 10) with none being successful in reducing kurtosis. 
The scatterplot of the independent variable plotted against the corresponding error 
variances showed a null relationship (Figure 11c) which was supported with a Pearson 
correlation, r = .05, ns.  The assumption of independence was upheld, but the assumption 
of normality of error variances showed a minor violation. This means that hypothesis five 
should be interpreted with some (minimal) caution. 
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The hypothesis six (hypervigilance predicting daily decision for NSSI) scatterplot 
of error variances plotted against the independent variable did not clearly demonstrate a 
relationship between the error and the independent variable, but the two were correlated, 
rpb = -.11, p < .05 (Figure 12). Several transformations of the independent variable 
(hypervigilance) were tried (natural log, inverse, quare root, Log10) with none resulting 
in independence with the error. This relationship constitutes a small violation of the 
independence assumption, but the result of the hypot esis six test should still be 
interpreted with caution. 
Statistical assumptions were met for hypotheses seven and eight. The Q-Q plot of 
the error variances of the hypothesis seven (daily ecision to use NSSI predicting daily 
effort in isolating oneself) Level 1 model appeared normal (Figure 13a). The histogram 
of the error variances plotted against the normal curve was also normally distributed 
(Figure 13b). The scatterplot of the Level 1 error variances plotted against the 
independent variable (decision to engage in NSSI) showed a null relationship (Figure 
13c), which was confirmed with a point-biserial correlation, rpb = .02, ns. Similar results 
supporting independence were demonstrated for hypotesis 8 (daily being alone to cope 
and daily use of NSSI), rpb = .04, ns (Figure 14). These results indicate that statistical 
assumptions were upheld for both the hypothesis seven and eight models. 
Analyses  
All hypotheses involve the relationship between twoLevel 1 variables. For these 
hypotheses, multilevel modeling was used to examine the direct relationship between 
daily variables nested within individuals. For the first hypothesis (daily peak distress 
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predicting search effort), peak distress significantly and negatively predicted search 
effort, γ(85) = -.10 (SE = .006, p < .001) (see Table 3). This analysis was conducted with 
the inversely transformed search effort variable; th refore, the coefficient should be 
interpreted as a positive relationship, γ(85) = .10. This indicates that a higher peak level 
of distress during the day was related to increased effort in searching for a coping 
strategy.  
For hypothesis two (daily distress predicting daily use of NSSI), a link function 
was used to transform the binary outcome into a ratio so that it could be analyzed using a 
linear model. The first test of this hypothesis used overall daily level of distress as the 
independent variable and was supported, γ(85)  = .95 (SE = .14, p < .001). The second 
test of hypothesis two was also supported, γ(85)  = .88 (SE = .15, p < .001). These results 
indicate that higher daily distress resulted in a greater likelihood of using NSSI on a 
given day. As these hypothesis tests had binary outcomes, their effect size should be 
assessed with odds ratios. The first test of hypothesis two resulted in an odds ratio of 
2.58, meaning that with every unit increase in the independent variable (i.e., one digit 
increase on the distress scale of 1-7) the odds of u ing NSSI increased another 2.58:1. 
This odds ratio is considered a medium effect size by conventional standards (small = 
1.50, medium = 2.50, large = 4.30). The odds ratio for the second test of hypothesis two 
was 2.41 and falls just short of a medium effect size. 
In order to test the third hypothesis (daily amount of time searching for coping 
strategy predicting daily use of NSSI to cope), a link function changing the dependent 
variable into a ratio was used as this model involved a binary outcome (1 = NSSI, 0 = any 
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other coping method). The third hypothesis was supported, γ(85)  = .003 (SE = .001, p < 
.01), indicating that more time spent searching for a coping strategy on a day resulted in a 
higher likelihood of using NSSI to cope. The odds ratio for this test was 1.003, which is a 
very small odds ratio. Thus, it seems that amount of time searching for a coping strategy 
was significantly associated with using NSSI to cope, but this association is quite small in 
a practical sense.  
Hypothesis four (lower perceived hope of finding a coping strategy predicting 
daily decision to use NSSI) used a link function transforming the dependent variable into 
a ratio as this variable was binary (1 = decided to use NSSI, = 0 didn’t decide to use 
NSSI). Hypothesis four was supported, γ(85)  = -.29 (SE = .13, p < .05), that is, that 
lower perceived hope of finding an effective coping strategy predicted a higher likelihood 
of deciding to use NSSI. Although this finding was significant, it appears that lower hope 
actually has a small impact on deciding to use NSSI (OR = .74). 
The relationship between perception of insufficient time to find a coping strategy 
and increased hypervigilant searching (phrased as frantic/disorganized in daily 
questionnaire) was analyzed to test hypothesis five. For this test, one statistical 
assumption was upheld (normality) while the other was violated (independence), 
indicating that the result must be interpreted with caution. There was a significant 
relationship between perception of insufficient time to find a coping strategy and 
increased hypervigilance, γ(85)  = .49, SE = .04, p < .001. This indicates that as 
participants were searching for a coping strategy, perception of sufficient time to find a 
coping strategy was associated with less frantic, disorganized, and hypervigilant 
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searching. Conversely, perceiving insufficient time resulted in more hypervigilant search 
strategies.  
Multilevel modeling was used to test hypothesis six by examining the relationship 
between hypervigilance and daily decision to use NSSI. This model used a link function 
transforming the dependent variable into a ratio as it was a binary variable. Hypothesis 
six was supported, γ(85)  = -.72 (SE = .15, p < .001).  That is, more hypervigilant or 
frantic searching predicted a greater likelihood of using of NSSI. The effect size for this 
relationship was quite small, however, OR = .49. 
In order to test hypothesis seven, multilevel modeling was used to assess the 
relationship between decision to engage in NSSI and effort in isolating oneself. The 
analysis resulted in a significant positive relationship between decision to engage in NSSI 
and effort in isolating oneself, γ(85)  = 1.70 (SE = .42, p < .001). In other words, deciding 
to use NSSI resulted in a greater effort to try andisolate oneself.  
Hypothesis eight was tested with multilevel modeling by examining the 
relationship between being alone to cope on a given day and use of NSSI. This model 
involved a link function transforming the dependent variable into a ratio as the dependent 
variable was binary. This hypothesis was supported, γ(85)  = 1.65 (SE = .54, p < .01), that 
is, actually isolating oneself predicted a greater use of NSSI. Moreover, this effect was 
very large, OR = 5.18.  
 Regarding the last two hypothesis tests, it could be argued that the variables of 
NSSI decision and NSSI use on the daily surveys are redundant and capture the same 
variance. That is, when one decides to use NSSI, they will always end up using it. If this 
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were true, then the relationship between decision to use NSSI and isolation effort 
(hypothesis seven), and the relationship between being alone to cope and NSSI use 
(hypothesis 8), would be unimportant as they would not have an impact beyond the 
relationship between decision to use NSSI and actual NSSI use. The data was examined 
for each of the 40 instances in which someone decided to use NSSI. Of this subsample, 
30 followed through on using NSSI, while 10 (i.e., 25%) used another coping behavior. 
Of the remaining 25% most chose to suppress their toughts or emotions (n = 6), while 
others used alcohol or drugs (n = 1), distraction (n = 2), or physical avoidance (n = 1). 
Thus, it is evident that a decision to engage in NSSI does not always result in actually 
using it. Moreover, it appears that the majority who decide to use NSSI, but fail to use it, 
end up using emotional and/or thought suppression. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Review of Hypotheses  
 This study examined the different steps of a theoretical model used to explain the 
decisional pathway from becoming distressed and using NSSI to cope with that distress. 
This model is applicable only to those who have previously used NSSI as a coping 
method for distress. A large body of empirical literature supports the theory that most 
people who use NSSI do so to cope with distress, and most instances of NSSI behavior 
are done to cope with distress. The goal of this study was to assess the steps of a 
theoretical model explaining the steps between becoming distressed and using NSSI to 
cope with that distress. 
 The results supported each independent part of the theoretical model (Figure 2). 
The model first delineated by Janis and Mann (1977, 1982; Figure 1) was devised for 
physical disasters and a desire to avoid bodily harm or death. It was adapted for this study 
to explain NSSI as a means to avoid further emotional harm (i.e., distress). Despite this 
theoretical “leap,” the different steps of the model w re supported by the current study’s 
data.  
 The first step of the model indicates that heightened distress and an assumed urge 
for NSSI (based on past research demonstrating that NSSI is most commonly used and 
effective for reducing distress) will lead to a search for coping methods. Due to the 
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deceptive nature of the study as a “coping study,” participants were not asked if they 
experienced an NSSI urge. Hypothesis one was created to t st this first step by examining 
if increased daily distress was related to an increase in effort to find a coping strategy. 
This hypothesis was supported for peak distress only, as overall distress was not 
examined due to violation of a statistical assumption for the hypothesis one statistical 
model. 
 Hypothesis two was a test of the overall premise of the model, rather than any 
particular step. The crux of this study and this theoretical model is that the reason for 
using NSSI is typically to reduce distress. Therefor , it was important to examine if that 
was true in this sample. The hypothesis was supported, that heightened emotional distress 
predicted a greater likelihood of NSSI for both overall distress and peak distress. 
Furthermore, 72.2% of the sample endorsed using NSSI over the past year for distress 
regulation reasons (automatic positive or negative reinforcement) on the FASM (Table 
4). It should be noted that some of the data for this analysis involved times when people 
used NSSI, but didn’t specifically say it was to reduce distress. Data were not collected 
on the reason for daily use of NSSI other than when it was specifically decided to use 
NSSI for coping. Therefore, some of the daily instaces of NSSI may have been due to 
other reasons (e.g., to gain attention). 
 The third hypothesis was an examination of one of the three possible outcomes of 
step two of the model. The theoretical model posits that somebody will use an alternative 
method of coping (to NSSI) if there is one readily identifiable and available. If not, one is 
much more likely to reluctantly fall back on a method of experiential avoidance, NSSI in 
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this model. The results supported this hypothesis, that less time searching for a coping 
strategy predicts a decision to use NSSI as a coping strategy. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Armey et al. (2011) found results demonstrating an increase in negative affect 
several hours prior to NSSI with negative affect then decreasing after NSSI. These 
authors used the PANAS-X in an experience sampling methodology study of 36 college 
students and found detectable increases in general g tive affect, guilt, and anger an 
average of 7.82 hours prior to using NSSI. They interpret these findings as evidence that 
several hours may pass between an urge to use NSSI to reduce negative affect and using 
NSSI for this purpose. The current study expands on this by theorizing that these hours 
between urge and use of NSSI are used trying to find an alternative way to cope with 
negative affect.  
 Hypothesis four maps directly onto step three of the model stating that no hope 
for using an alternative coping strategy (to NSSI) will result in deciding to use NSSI as 
an experiential avoidance method of coping. Although the theoretical model 
conceptualizes this step as dichotomous (hope or nohope), this study assessed constructs 
dimensionally whenever possible. This allowed a more appropriate fit to the statistical 
model. The hypothesis was supported, that lack of hope predicted use of NSSI.  
 The fifth hypothesis mapped onto step four of the model. This step indicates that 
if one perceives there to be sufficient time to find a coping strategy for their distress, then 
they will search in an adaptive and vigilant fashion. Alternatively, if one feels there is not 
sufficient time, they will search in a maladaptive and hypervigilant fashion that is 
characterized by frantic and disorganized searching. Similar to the variable of hope, the 
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variables of sufficient time and hypervigilance were measured in a continuous fashion. 
When examined in this dimensional way, hypothesis five and thus step four, were 
supported. 
Hypothesis six maps onto the second assumption of the model’s fourth step. The 
model assumes that when one searches in a vigilant fashion they will select an “adaptive” 
coping strategy (rather than NSSI). On the other hand, if they search in a hypervigilant 
fashion they will likely fall back on using NSSI asexperiential avoidance to cope. The 
results were consistent with this hypothesis, providing evidence in support of step four of 
the model. At first read, this hypothesis may seem contradictory to hypothesis three. As 
discussed in the introduction, hypervigilance leads to “premature closure” and the 
selection of an avoidance technique (NSSI in this case). This could imply that more 
hypervigilance results in spending LESS time looking for a strategy and using NSSI. This 
is in direct contrast to hypothesis three stating that MORE time searching will lead to 
using NSSI. In order to further explore the implied r lationship between hypervigilance 
and time spent searching, a multilevel model using the same structure as the hypothesis 
test models was analyzed to see if these two variables were related. The results 
demonstrated a null relationship between the two variables, γ = -3.18 (SE = 2.91, ns),  
indicating that hypervigilance is not associated with less time searching for a coping 
strategy, and thus hypothesis three and six are not in contrast. 
 An important assumption of steps two, three, and four of the model is that NSSI is 
used as a form of experiential avoidance when used to cope with emotions. Studies have 
demonstrated that those using NSSI tend to use moreethods of experiential avoidance 
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to cope in comparison to those not using NSSI (e.g., Andover et al., 2007; Brown et al., 
2007). Additionally, frequency of NSSI has been found to positively correlate with 
greater use of avoidant coping (Hasking et al., 2008). More recently, studies have 
examined how NSSI is related to experiential avoidance. Howe-Martin, Murrell, & 
Guarnaccia (2012) administered questionnaires to 211 American high school students. 
Participants reporting using NSSI in their lifetime evidenced greater thought suppression 
as measured by the White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). In a 
study of 214 college students, Anderson and Crowther (2012) found those using NSSI in 
the past year to report higher levels of experiential avoidance on the White Bear 
Suppression Inventory and Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (Hayes et al., 2004) in 
comparison to those not using NSSI in their lifetime. 
 Hypothesis seven reflects the third assumption of the fourth step of the model 
which theorizes that once a person decides to use NSSI, they will try isolating 
themselves. For this hypothesis test, effort in isolating oneself was assessed 
dimensionally. The hypothesis was confirmed in thisstudy. 
 The final step of the model is dichotomous in nature and suggests that someone’s 
use of NSSI to cope with distress is contingent upon their ability to isolate themselves. 
Specifically, if they do isolate themselves they will use NSSI and if they are unable to 
isolate themselves they will endure the distress and not cope with it. This hypothesis was 
supported.  
 Post-hoc analyses were conducted to determine if solitude was related to other 
coping behaviors. Specifically, using alcohol or drugs was examined as this behavior is 
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similar to NSSI in multiple respects – both are active behaviors and neither are socially 
accepted as good coping behavior. Two HLM models fol owing the same structure as the 
hypothesis tests were used to examine if using alcoho /drugs on a particular day was 
related to 1) isolation effort, and 2) being alone to cope. The results demonstrated a 
significant and negative relationship between alcohol/drug use and isolation effort, γ(85)  
= -.43 (OR = .65, SE = .16, p < .01), and between alcohol/drug use and being alone t  
cope, γ(85)  = -1.90 (OR = .15, SE = .59, p < .01). Thus, the opposite relationship was 
found in that using drugs/alcohol to cope was related to decreased effort in isolation and a 
higher likelihood to be around others. This provides evidence that the findings of 
hypotheses seven and eight, and therefore the last two steps of the model, are specific to 
using NSSI to cope. Moreover, of the 19 participants who used NSSI during the study, 
only 6 also used alcohol/drugs during the study (of 13 total participants who used 
alcohol/drugs). 
Research Implications  
The results of this study have implications for additional areas of research. One 
endeavor, given the results of this study, would be to xamine the model in its entirety. 
This study tested the steps of the model individually; however, this does not necessarily 
support the model as a whole. That is, even though individual parts of the model (e.g., 
isolation results in higher likelihood of NSSI) have support from this study, these parts 
may not flow together as indicated (see Figure 2). A less intensive methodology and 
statistical analysis could be used to assess the mod l as a whole. Data on NSSI 
antecedents and decisions could be collected from individual self-injurers via 
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questionnaires and/or interviews. This methodology has been used to assess why people 
engage in NSSI and their affective experiences prior to NSSI (e.g., Kampuis et al., 2007; 
Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005). Self-injurers could be queried about specific NSSI 
occurrences (e.g., last time) or about their NSSI in general to determine, to the best of 
their memory and understanding, if they had the desire to reduce their distress, if they 
considered NSSI, if they searched for other options, a d so on. Using this data, a simpler 
statistic such as path analysis could be used as the data would not be nested (i.e., 
multileveled).  
 In addition to the variables included in this model (s e Figure 2), there may be 
other factors related to specific instances of using NSSI for distress regulation that should 
be studied. In addition to the degree of distress one feels, the degree of urgency may also 
be important. Recent studies have demonstrated that NSSI is associated with urgency, a 
“tendency to act ‘impulsively’ when experiencing negative affect” (Lynam, Miller, 
Miller, Bornovalova, & Lejuez, 2010, p. 152). For example, Black and Mildred (2013) 
examined 106 internet recruited adult females from eight different countries (primarily 
Australia, USA, and UK) who had self-injured in the past year. They administered the 
UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) and used logistic 
regression to see if the urgency and lack of persevrance predicted “impulsive” NSSI 
(cutting, burning, carving, punching, or skin-picking). In this study urgency predicted 
impulsive NSSI while lack of perseverance did not. In another study, Lynam et al. (2010) 
examined how the number of different methods of NSSI (lifetime) correlated with 
different facets of impulsivity including urgency. They also used the UPPS questionnaire 
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in their sample of 76 substance abuse inpatients. Their results indicated that the number 
of NSSI methods was significantly associated with greater urgency in addition to lack of 
premeditation and lack of perseverance.  
Another important factor may be the amount (or rather lack of) of social support 
one has available. Klonsky and Glenn (2008) found in their study of college students that 
90% of their NSSI using sample had tried to resist NSSI urges. Six of the nine most 
endorsed methods of resisting NSSI urges were social in n ture, including “being around 
friends” (endorsed by 80%) and “talking to someone about how you feel” (endorsed by 
74%). A more comprehensive model may help us better understand the process beginning 
with an urge to use NSSI for distress and ending with the use of NSSI. Statistically 
speaking, this consideration of comprehensiveness would best be tested by analyzing the 
model as a whole, as discussed above. This approach would allow researchers to 
determine the relative contribution of factors (e.g., decisions) and not simply whether or 
not they are statistically related to each other and/or using NSSI.  
 Another area for future research is in social reasons for NSSI. This study was 
designed to specifically examine instances of NSSI used for distress regulation. Research 
has shown that distress regulation is by far the most c mmon reason for using NSSI (e.g., 
Kleindeinst et al., 2008; Klonsky, 2011). Social reasons for NSSI such as gaining 
attention or avoiding an interpersonal obligation are endorsed far less commonly (10-
31%; Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007; Nixon et al., 200 ; Nock et al., 2009), but still 
warrant attention. Perhaps it is the same factors, but conceptualized in a different way. 
For example, “hope of finding a healthy method of reducing distress” could be restated as 
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“hope of finding a healthy way of gaining attention.” Alternatively, other social variables 
not included in this study may be important, such as characteristics of particular 
relationships and perception of others. For example, Bureau et al. (2010) examined self-
report questionnaires of current parent-child relationships (mother and father combined) 
in 1,238 undergraduate students from one Canadian university with 105 of this 
undergraduate sample endorsing NSSI in the past six months. They found the NSSI group 
to report more failed protection, less trust of parents, worse communication with parents, 
and more alienation from parents in comparison to those not using NSSI. Another study 
compared 23 undergraduates using NSSI to cope with their stress in their lifetime to 23 
controls on a retrospective self-report measure of social support (Heath et al., 2009). The 
results found a significant difference in perceived support of friends (lower for NSSI 
group), but not for parents. These findings warrant the consideration of peer and parent 
relationships when considering single instances of NSSI used for social reasons.  
Clinical Implications 
 The results of this study have implications for therapy approaches, and cognitive-
behavioral therapy (CBT) in particular. For example, articular cognitions found to be 
related to daily use of NSSI, use of NSSI to cope with distress, or decision to use NSSI to 
cope with distress could be addressed in CBT. For example, the perception of less hope 
to find an effective coping strategy was associated with a greater likelihood of deciding to 
use NSSI to cope. The cognition of being able to find a coping strategy for distress other 
than NSSI could be challenged and restructured in CBT. Similarly, a perception of less 
“sufficient time” to find an effective coping strategy was associated with increased 
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hypervigilance, which was then associated with a higher likelihood of deciding to use 
NSSI. Although this relationship isn’t direct, the results indicate that “less time” may be 
associated with deciding to use NSSI to cope. This would be another cognition to assess 
in CBT and treat accordingly. No study to date has examined specific beliefs/cognitions 
about NSSI, with the one exception being that it is helpful for reducing distress (e.g., 
Lewis & Santor, 2010). 
 In addition to addressing cognitions, specific behavioral interventions could be 
used to facilitate reducing NSSI behavior. This study demonstrated the importance of 
solitude in using NSSI, which is consistent with prior studies showing that solitude is a 
strong correlate and predictor of NSSI behavior (Klonsky, 2009; Nixon et al., 2002; Nock 
et al., 2009; Whitlock et al., 2012). In this case, ocial support and social presence seem 
to be important protective factors for NSSI. This is consistent with research conducted by 
Klonsky and Glenn (2008). These authors assessed self-report of behaviors used to resist 
urges to engage in NSSI. There were twelve behaviors endorsed by more than 50% of the 
sample. Of these 12 behaviors, half involved social interactions: “being around friends,” 
“talking to someone about how you feel,” “talking to friends,” “interacting with someone 
who is nice to you,” “finding someone who is understanding,” and “being around 
people.” Moreover, “finding someone who is understanding” was rated as the third most 
successful behavior behind “doing sports or exercis recreationally,” and “removing the 
means/instrument typically used to self-harm from home.”  
The current study and prior literature highlight the need to address social behavior 
in the treatment of NSSI. Given the results of thisstudy, it seems important for those 
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using NSSI to simply be in the presence of others when distressed. Klonsky and Glenn 
(2008) also found that being around others is helpful in resisting the urge to use NSSI. 
These authors found that in addition to social presence, interacting with others is 
important. When selecting behavioral interventions for reducing NSSI, it is important to 
include social interventions and resources in daily life. 
Limitations 
There are some important limitations to note in this study. Firstly, a small sample 
of participants actually used NSSI in the study (3.5%, Table 1). There was an even lower 
rate of using NSSI to cope (1.9%) which is likely the reason for the small effect size 
found for hypothesis 3 (less time spent searching for a coping strategy predicting NSSI to 
cope). Similarly, the low rate of deciding to use NSSI to cope (4%) may be the reason for 
small effect sizes found for the hypothesis four and six tests, which both included 
decision to use NSSI to cope as the dependent variable.  
 Another noteworthy limitation is that some steps of the theoretical model (Figure 
2) were not assessed directly due to the deception used in this study. For example, 
participants were told this was a study about coping behavior in general; therefore, 
certain tenants of the model such as heightened emotional distress leading to an urge for 
NSSI (step one) could not be directly asked without revealing the true nature of the study. 
Similarly, steps two, three, and four assumed that lack of time, hope, and vigilance 
(respectively) would result in giving in to urges for NSSI when trying to use another 
coping method. The assumption that individuals were trying to abstain from NSSI during 
their coping decisions could not be directly tested in the study. 
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Arguably, the most noteworthy limitation of the study is the tenuous applicability 
of the theoretical model for explaining the use of NSSI under distress. The theory created 
by Janis and Mann (1977) was specifically designed for life-threatening events, and 
emotional distress is certainly not one of those evnts. This theoretical limitation has 
possibly resulted in methodological and interpretive l mitations in this study. For 
example, participants were asked about “hope” and perception of “sufficient time” with 
regard to deciding on a way to cope with distress. These variables, while applicable to 
life-threatening situations, may not be consciously considered when people are coping 
with their distress. Given literature showing a positive relationship between NSSI and 
urgency (Black & Mildred, 2013; Lynam et al., 2010) it seems likely that “hope” and 
“sufficient time” are not carefully and consciously considered when deciding to use or 
not use NSSI for coping with distress. Rather they are redundant and part of the same 
rapid determination that is made out of awareness. Although the current dataset does not 
allow for examination of awareness/consciousness, speed of these processes and limited 
examination of redundancy can be analyzed. 
Speed of these decisional processes was indirectly assessed by examining how 
much time people spent each day on “searching” for a st ategy to cope with their distress. 
The mean for all 1109 daily surveys was 26.72 minutes (SD = 83.64). The time taken to 
search for a strategy was even longer when NSSI was ultimately used (n = 39, M = 68.90, 
SD = 232.72). Thus, it appears that ample time was used in searching for a coping 
strategy which would likely accommodate for such determinations as hope for a strategy 
and sufficient time for a strategy. 
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In order to test the argument that hope and sufficient time in this model are 
redundant, the relationship between these two variables and NSSI outcome variables 
(NSSI use, NSSI decision) using HLM was assessed. Rsults indicated that hope and 
sufficient time had a significant positive relationship, γ(85)  = .58 ( SE = .04, p < .001) 
with each other. Additionally, hope, γ(85)  = -.29 (OR = .75, SE = .13, p < .05), and 
sufficient time γ(85)  = -.44 (OR = .64, SE = .14, p < .01) were each significantly and 
negatively related to the decision for NSSI. Hope, γ(85)  = -.33 (OR = .72, SE = .14, p < 
.05), and sufficient time, γ(85)  = -42 (OR = .66, SE = .14, p < .01), were also negatively 
related to the actual daily use of NSSI. Interestingly, when both sufficient time and hope 
were entered in the same model, only sufficient time remained significant. This was true 
for both NSSI decision and NSSI use. These findings give some evidence that hope may 
be redundant to and subsumed under sufficient time. In other words, it appears that the 
relationship between hope and NSSI decision/use is mediated by sufficient time. It does 
appear that steps 2 and 3 of this decision making process may indeed be collapsible into 
one step. 
A similar question could be raised about redundancy of “sufficient time” and the 
actual time spent searching for a way to cope with distress. A post-hoc HLM analysis 
indicated a significant, yet negative relationship between actual time used and rating of 
sufficient time, γ(85)  = -.006 (SE = .002, p < .001). In other words, the more time one 
feels they have to search for a coping behavior, the less time they actually need. One 
interpretation is that a higher perception of sufficient time results in faster searching. 
Another interpretation is that a coping behavior is immediately identified (low time) 
                  
 
59 
 
resulting a subjective rating of ample time to search. The former interpretation suggests 
independent steps; however, the second interpretation suggests redundancy. At this time 
it remains unclear if these are actually separate steps or the same step. Moreover, the use 
of actual time to find a coping behavior is suspect as ime per se was not part of the 
original Janis and Mann (1977) model. Rather, time, as discussed in the introduction is a 
proxy for the step of having a coping behavior “immediately available” and thus using it. 
In future research, other ways of assessing this step should be used such as directly 
asking if a coping behavior was immediately available and implemented. 
 Lastly, hope and actual time used to find a coping strategy were assessed for 
redundancy. An HLM model using the same structure as the hypothesis tests revealed 
that these variables were not significantly related, γ(85)  = 3.92 (SE = 4.66, p = .40). 
Thus, it appears that these variables are not redundant.  
Another limitation involves the use of retrospective reporting at the end of each 
day of the study. Specifically, participants may have rated such variables as hope, 
sufficient time, and actual time based on whether or not they were successful with coping 
that day. In order to examine this HLM models were us d to examine the relationship 
between each of these variables and subjective coping effectiveness. Results showed that 
each of these variables were significantly related to effectiveness: hope γ(85)  = .39 (SE = 
.04, p < .001); sufficient time γ(85)  = .33 (SE = .04, p < .001); actual time γ(85)  = -.004 
( SE = .001, p < .001). Additionally, each of these variables remained significant when 
combined in the same model at Level 1. These results ggest that these three variables 
may have been influenced by ratings of effectiveness. One counter to this argument is 
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that the rating for effectiveness was provided later in the online questionnaire and 
couldn’t itself have influenced ratings of the above variables. Rather, participants would 
have to have thought about how well they coped during the day before completing the 
questionnaire, which seems unlikely. It is ostensibly more likely, given the order of 
questions, that participants rated hope, sufficient time, and actual time, and then came to 
the conclusion that they coped effectively. 
One last limitation is simply a terminological one. The use of vigilance and 
hypervigilance could understandably be confusing. These terms were borrowed from 
Janis and Mann (1977) in order to retain similarities between models where possible. The 
term hypervigilance suggests more vigilance that is not necessarily bad, which is in 
contrast to how Janis and Mann describe it as “maladaptive.” Future research involving 
applications of the Janis and Mann model would benefit from alternate wording such as 
“effective” instead of vigilant and “ineffective” instead of hypervigilant. Alternatively, 
vigilance/hypervigilance could be divided into further constructs as the components of 
“organized and complete” on one pole and “disorganized and frantic” on the other pole 
should not necessarily be grouped together. That is, organization does not equate to 
completeness and vice versa. It may be useful to separate these constructs in future 
research. 
Strengths 
 The current study is an important contribution to the literature for multiple 
reasons. Foremost, it is novel in scope. Few studies to date have examined individual acts 
of NSSI. Moreover, no study to date has examined th decisions, cognitions, and 
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behaviors leading up to a particular act of NSSI. Another strength of the study was its use 
of experiential sampling methodology. By assessing participants with a recent history of 
NSSI for 14-21 days using a convenient format (e-mail), the factors associated with 
coping and NSSI could be recorded on a daily basis, thu  minimizing errors due to 
memory construction, forgetting, and memory biases. Finally, this study used multilevel 
modeling to maximize relationships between variables y addressing daily variance 
nested within individual variance. 
Conclusion 
 This study was designed to address a gap in the literature pertaining to what 
causes specific instances of NSSI to reduce distress. In order to address this question, a 
theoretical foundation was created by adapting a model f decision making under distress 
created by Janis and Mann (1977). With this model as a guide, experience sampling 
methodology was used to provide support for each step of the model. These findings 
provide important information for what leads up to using NSSI after becoming 
emotionally distressed. In turn, these findings provide ideas for treating NSSI using 
cognitive, behavioral, and social strategies. Future studies should seek to further this 
research by assessing the model as a whole, asking questions about NSSI directly, and by 
including other important variables related to the us of NSSI
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APPENDIX A 
FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SELF-MUTILATION 
Within the past year, have you ever intentionally engaged in the following behaviors 
(without the intent to kill yourself)? (check all that apply): 
 No Yes Approx. how 
many times? 
Have you gotten 
medical treatment? 
1. Cut or carved your skin     
2. Hit yourself on purpose     
3. Pulled your hair out (with the intent 
of hurting yourself) 
    
4. Gave yourself a tattoo     
5. Picked at a wound (with the intent of 
hurting yourself) 
    
6. Burned your skin (i.e., with a 
cigarette, match or other hot object) 
    
7. Inserted objects under your nails or 
skin 
    
8. Bit yourself (e.g., your mouth or lip) 
(with the intent of hurting yourself) 
    
9. Picked areas of your body to the 
point of drawing blood (with the 
intent of hurting yourself) 
    
10. Scraped your skin     
11. “Erased” your skin to the point of 
drawing blood 
    
12. Other (specify):     
 
 
14. How long did you think about doing the above act(s) before  
      actually doing it? ____________________________ 
 
15. Did you perform any of the above behaviors while you were taking drugs or alcohol? 
Yes        No 
 
16. Did you experience pain during this self-harm? 
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 Severe pain 
 Moderate pain 
 Little pain 
 No pain 
 
 
17. How old were you when you first harmed yourself in this way? 
____________________ 
 
18. If not in the past year, have you ever done any of the above acts?   
Yes        No 
 
Did you harm yourself for any of the reasons below? (check all that apply): 
 
O 
Never 
1 
Rarely 
2 
Sometimes 
3 
Often 
 
Reasons: Rating 
1a. To avoid school, work, or other activities  
2a. To relieve feeling “numb” or empty  
3a. To get attention  
4a. To feel something, even if it was pain  
5a. To avoid having to do something unpleasant you don’t want to do  
6a. To get control of a situation  
7a. To try to get a reaction from someone, even if it’s a negative 
reaction 
 
8a. To receive more attention from your parents and friends  
9a. To avoid being with people  
10a. To punish yourself  
11a. To get other people to act differently or change  
12a. To be like someone you respect  
13a. To avoid punishment or paying the consequences  
14a. To stop bad feelings  
15a. To let others know how desperate you were  
16a. To feel more a part of a group  
17a. To get your parents to understand or notice you  
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18a. To give yourself something to do when alone  
19a. To give yourself something to do when with others  
20a. To get help  
21a. To make others angry  
22a. To feel relaxed  
23a. Other (specify):  
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APPENDIX B 
 
COPE 
We are interested in how people respond when they confront difficult or stressful events 
in their lives. There are lots of ways to try to deal with stress. This questionnaire asks you 
to indicate what you generally do and feel, when you experience stressful events. 
Obviously, different events bring out somewhat different responses, but think about what 
you usually do when you are under a lot of stress.  
 
Then respond to each of the following items by filling in the correct circle using the 
response choices listed below. Please try to respond to each item separately in your mind 
from each other item. Choose your answers thoughtfully, and make your answers as true 
FOR YOU as you can. Please answer every item. There ar  no “right” or “wrong” 
answers, so choose the most accurate answer for YOU—not what you think “most 
people” would say or do. Indicate what YOU usually do when YOU experience a 
stressful event.  
 
Then, for each item, fill in how much each thing helps you cope with the stress and feel 
better from “Not at all” to “A lot.”  
 
1 = Not at all  2 = A little bit  3 = A medium amount  4 = A lot 
 
1. I try to grow as a person as a result of the experience.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
2. I turn to work or other substitute activities to take my mind off things.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
3. I get upset and let my emotions out.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
4. I try to get advice from someone about what to do. 
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
5. I concentrate my efforts on doing something about it.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
6. I say to myself “this isn’t real.” 
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
7. I put my trust in God.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
8. I laugh about the situation.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
9. I admit to myself that I can’t deal with it, and quit trying.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
10. I restrain myself from doing anything too quickly.  1 2 3 4 
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     How much does this help? 1 2 3 4 
11. I discuss my feelings with someone.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
12. I use alcohol or drugs to make myself feel better.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
13. I get used to the idea that it happened.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
14. I talk to someone to find out more about the situat on.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
15. I keep myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
16. I daydream about things other than this.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
17. I get upset, and am really aware of it.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
18. I seek God’s help.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
19. I make a plan of action.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
20. I make jokes about it.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
21. I accept that this has happened and that it can’t be changed.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
22. I hold off doing anything about it until the situation permits.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
23. I try to get emotional support from friends or relatives.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
24. I just give up trying to reach my goal.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
25. I take additional action to try to get rid of the problem.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
26. I try to lose myself for a while by drinking alcohol or taking drugs.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
27. I refuse to believe that it has happened.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
28. I let my feelings out.  
     How much does this help?  
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
29. I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
30. I talk to someone who could do something concrete about the 
problem.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
31. I sleep more than usual.  1 2 3 4 
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     How much does this help? 1 2 3 4 
32. I try to come up with a strategy about what to do. 
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
33. I focus on dealing with this problem, and if necessary let other things 
slide a little.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
34. I get sympathy and understanding from someone.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
35. I drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
36. I kid around about it.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
37. I give up the attempt to get what I want.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
38. I look for something good in what is happening.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
39. I think about how I might best handle the problem.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
40. I pretend that it hasn’t really happened.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
41. I make sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
42. I try hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at 
dealing with this.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
43. I go to movies or watch tv, to think about it less.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
44. I accept the reality of the fact that it happened.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
45. I ask people who have had similar experiences what they did.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
46. I feel a lot of emotional distress and I find myself expressing those 
feelings a lot.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
47. I take direct action to get around the problem.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
48. I try to find comfort in my religion.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
49. I force myself to wait for the right time to dos mething.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
50. I make fun of the situation.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
51. I reduce the amount of effort I’m putting into s lving the problem.  1 2 3 4 
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     How much does this help? 1 2 3 4 
52. I talk to someone about how I feel.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
53. I use alcohol or drugs to help me get through it.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
54. I learn to live with it.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
55. I put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
56. I think hard about what steps to take.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
57. I act as though it hasn’t even happened.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
58. I do what has to be done, one step at a time.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
59. I learn something from the experience.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
60. I pray more than usual.  
     How much does this help? 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
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APPENDIX C 
 
DAILY QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. For the purposes of this study, distress is defined as any unwanted emotional state 
(e.g., angry, sad, scared, anxious, numb). Please rank the overall degree to which 
you were distressed today.: 
a. minimally  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 --- 7 extremely 
 
b. What was your highest level of distress today? 
minimally  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 --- 7 extremely 
 
2. How hard did you look for a coping strategy to reduce your distress? 
not hard at all  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 ---- 7 very hard 
 
3. To what degree did you feel hopeful of finding something to do to reduce your 
distress? 
no hope at all 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 ---- 7 certain of finding a way 
 
4. To what extent did you feel there was sufficient time to search for and consider 
information and advice to help you find something to reduce your distress? 
no time at all 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 ---- 7 as much time as I needed 
 
5. When searching for a strategy to reduce distress, to what degree do you think your 
search was frantic and disorganized versus thorough and organized? 
frantic/disorganized 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 ---- 7 organized and 
complete 
 
6. Sometimes people make the decision to engage in a beh vior and they may or 
may not follow through on their decision. What methods did you decide to use to 
reduce your distress today? Choose all that apply. 
a. Used alcohol or nonprescribed drugs 
b. Tried to distract yourself (e.g., music, television) 
c. Avoided or left the distressing situation 
d. Tried to suppress thoughts or emotions 
e. Self-injured without intent to die (e.g., cutting, burning, scratching, 
striking, biting, pulling hair, or any other injury to external body tissue) 
f. Talked to somebody for support or help 
g. Dealt with the distressing situation directly by tring to solve the problem 
h. Other (please specify): _____________________________ 
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7. Primarily, what did you actually do today to try and reduce your distress? In other 
words, what was your main method of reducing your distress. Exception: If you 
used self-injury without intent to die at any time, choose this one. 
a. Used alcohol or non-presribed drugs 
b. Tried to distract yourself (e.g., music, television) 
c. Avoided or left the distressing situation 
d. Tried to suppress thoughts or emotions 
e. Self-injured without intent to die (e.g., cutting, burning, scratching, 
striking, biting, pulling hair, or any other injury to external body tissue) 
f. Talked to somebody for support or help 
g. Dealt with the distressing situation directly by tring to solve the problem 
h. Other (please specify): _____________________________ 
 
8. How successful was this method at reducing your dist es ? 
not at all 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 --- 7 very successful 
 
9. Once you started searching for a way to reduce distres , how long did it take you 
to identify the strategy that you actually used? 
i. hours _______ 
ii.  minutes ________ 
 
10. How hard did you try to isolate yourself (i.e., be alone) to use your coping 
method? 
not at all 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 --- 7 very hard 
 
11. Who were you with when you used your coping strategy? 
i. Alone 
ii.  Friend(s) or peer(s) 
iii.  Family member(s) 
iv. Stranger(s) 
v. Other (please specify): ________________ 
 
12. If you were with other people when you used your coping strategy, how close did 
you feel to them? 
not close at all 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 ---- 7 very close 
 
13. How much time passed between when you decided to use the coping method and 
when you actually did it? 
a. hours _______ 
b. minutes ________ 
 
14. Did you purposefully hurt yourself (exterior body tissue) today without the intent 
to die? 
Yes   No 
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a. If yes, what did you do: 
i. Cut or carved your skin 
ii.  Hit yourself on purpose 
iii.  Pulled your hair out (with intent to hurt yourself) 
iv. Picked at a wound (with intent to hurt yourself) 
v. Gave yourself a tattoo 
vi. Burned your skin (i.e., with a cigarette, match or other hot object) 
vii.  Inserted objects under your nails or skin 
viii.  Bit yourself (e.g., your mouth or lip) (with the intent to hurt 
yourself) 
ix. Picked areas of your body to the point of drawing blood (with the 
intent to hurt yourself) 
x. Scraped your skin 
xi. “Erased” your skin to the point of drawing blood 
xii. Other (please specify): ____________ 
b. If yes, how successful was this strategy in reducing your distress? 
   not at all 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 ---- 7 very successful 
 
c. If yes, how much did you regret it? 
not at all 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 --- 7 very much 
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APPENDIX D 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges, and Percentage Endorsed for Functional 
Assessment of Self-Mutilation Frequency of NSSI in the Past Year (n = 83) and Daily 
Questionnaire Variables Used in Analyses (n = 1109) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Range 
Percent of daily 
questionnaires 
behavior was endorsed 
Frequency of NSSI 
past year 
 
32.57 
 
59.61 
 
0-302 
 
- 
Overall Distress 2.95 1.69 0-7 - 
Peak Distress 3.42 1.84 0-7 - 
Effort in Distress 
Reduction Search 
 
2.65 
 
1.69 
 
0-7 
 
- 
Hope of Finding 
Distress Reduction 
 
4.21 
 
2.00 
 
0-7 
 
- 
Sufficient time to 
find Distress 
Reduction 
 
4.22 
 
2.09 
 
0-7 
 
- 
Frantic/Disorganized 
Searching* 
 
4.40 
 
2.00 
 
0-7 
 
- 
Decision to Use 
NSSI to Reduce 
Distress 
 
.04 
 
.20 
 
0-1 
 
4% 
Used NSSI to 
Reduce Distress 
 
.02 
 
.14 
 
0-1 
 
1.9% 
Time Used to Search 
for Distress 
Reduction (minutes) 
 
26.72 
 
83.64 
 
0-1440 
 
- 
Effort in Isolation to 
Cope 
 
2.75 
 
1.89 
 
0-7 
 
- 
Being Alone to 
Cope 
 
.47 
 
.50 
 
0-1 
 
- 
Time Between 
Coping Decision and 
 
25.28 
 
85.55 
 
0-1500 
 
- 
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Implementation 
(minutes) 
Used NSSI .04 .18 0-1 3.5% 
* Higher scores indicate more organized searching. 
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Table 2 
 
Frequency and Percent of Coping Behaviors Endorsed on Daily Surveys for Entire Study 
Sample (n = 1109 surveys) 
 
Coping Behavior Frequency  Percent  
Alcohol or Drugs 22 2 
Distraction 255 23 
Avoidance 
(Physical) 
135 12.2 
Thought or 
Emotion 
Suppression 
124 11.2 
NSSI 21 1.9 
Talked to 
Somebody 
195 17.6 
Dealt with Situation 
Directly 
223 20.1 
Other 131 11.8 
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Table 3 
 
Coefficients, Standard Errors, Significance, and Effect Sizes for Hypothesis Tests 
 
Hypothesis Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
γ SE p Effect size* 
One Peak Distress Search Effort .10 .006 <.001  
Two Overall Distress NSSI Use .95 .14 <.001 OR = 2.58 
Two Peak Distress NSSI Use .88 .15 <.001 OR = 2.41 
Three Time Searching NSSI Use to Cope .003 .001 <.01 OR = 1.003 
Four Hope NSSI Decision -.29 .13 <.05 OR = .74 
Five Sufficient Time Vigilance .49 .04 <.001  
Six Hypervigilance NSSI Decision .72 .15 <.001 OR = .49 
Seven NSSI Decision Isolation Effort 1.70 .42 <.001  
Eight Isolation NSSI Use 1.65 .54 <.01 OR = 5.18 
Note. OR = Odds Ratio. γ = coefficient. SE = standard error. p = significance. All 
hypothesis tests had 85 degrees of freedom. 
* Odds ratios of 1.50 are considered small, while 2.50 are considered medium and 4.30 
are large.  
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Table 4 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges, and Percentage Endorsed for Functional 
Assessment of Self-Mutilation Function Items and Function Factors for Sample Used in 
Analyses (n = 83) 
 
 
Functional Assessment of Self-
Mutilation Function Item 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Range 
Percent of Sample 
Endorsing 
Item/Scale 
Avoid school, work, or other 
activities 
.35 .70 0-3 
 
25% 
Relieve feeling “numb” or 
empty 
.93 1.08 0-3 
 
50% 
Get attention .36 .72 0-3 25% 
Feel something, even if it is 
pain 
.92 1.12 0-3 
 
45.8% 
Avoid having to do something 
unpleasant you don’t want to do 
.28 .61 0-3 
 
20.8% 
Get control of a situation .88 1.17 0-3 41.7% 
Try to get a reaction from 
someone, even if it’s a negative 
reaction 
.50 .84 0-3 
 
30.6% 
Receive more attention from 
your parents and friends 
.32 
 
.78 0-3 
 
18.1% 
Avoid being with people .19 .57 0-3 12.5% 
Punish yourself .94 1.02 0-3 54.2% 
Get other people to act 
differently or change 
.35 .82 0-3 
 
18.1% 
Be like someone you respect .13 .41 0-2 9.7% 
Avoid punishment of paying the 
consequences 
.08 .33 0-2 6.9% 
Stop bad feelings .86 .98 0-3 52.8% 
Let others know how desperate 
you were 
.29 .66 0-3 19.4% 
Feel more a part of a group .13 .44 0-2 8.3% 
Get your parents to understand 
or notice you 
.21 .60 0-3 12.5% 
Give yourself something to do 
when alone 
.25 .58 0-2 18.1% 
Give yourself something to do 
when with others 
.07 .35 0-2 4.2% 
Get help .25 .62 0-3 16.7% 
Make others angry .19 .58 0-3 12.5% 
Feel relaxed .72 1.02 0-3 38.9% 
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Functional Assessment of Self-
Mutilation Function Scale 
    
Automatic Negative 
Reinforcement (2 items) 
1.79 1.86 0-6 
 
59.7% 
Automatic Positive 
Reinforcement (3 items) 
2.58 2.54 0-9 68.1% 
Social Negative Reinforcement 
(4 items) 
.90 1.75 0-9 33.3% 
Social Positive Reinforcement 
(12 items) 
3.85 5.32 0-24 63.9% 
 
Automatic Negative or Positive 
Reinforcement 
4.38 4.15 0-15 72.2% 
Social Negative or Positive 
Reinforcement 
4.75 3.00 0-32 68.1% 
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Figure 1. Model of decision making under stress. Adapted from “Decisionmaking: A 
psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment,” by I. L. Janis, and L. Mann, 
New York: Free Press.
Step 1) Decision that 
Danger is Imminent 
Step 3) No Effective 
Strategy Identified, 
but Still Hopeful 
Step 3) No Hope for 
Effective Coping 
Strategy 
Step 2) Assess for 
Effective Coping 
Strategy 
 
Step 4) 
Sufficient Time 
to Search 
Step 4) 
Insufficient 
Time to Search 
Hypervigilance  Vigilance 
Premature 
Closure 
Experiential 
Avoidance Technique 
Resort to 
“Defective 
Coping Pattern” 
Likely Effective  
Coping Strategy 
Identify and 
Use Available 
Effective 
Strategy 
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Figure 2. NSSI model of decision making under distress. 
 
Step 1) Heightened 
emotional distress and 
NSSI urge 
Step 3) No Effective 
Strategy Identified, 
but Still Hopeful 
Step 3) No Hope for 
Effective Coping 
Strategy other than 
NSSI 
Step 2) Assess for 
Effective Coping 
Strategy (Not NSSI) 
 
Step 5) Can’t 
Isolate Self 
Step 5) 
Isolate Self 
NSSI Endure 
Distress 
Step 4) 
Sufficient Time 
to Search 
Step 4) 
Insufficient 
Time to Search  
 
Decision for 
NSSI 
Likely 
Effective 
Coping 
Strategy (not 
NSSI) 
Identify and 
Use Available 
Effective 
Strategy (Not 
NSSI) 
Hypervigilance  Vigilance 
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Figure 3. Distribution of daily NSSI use for those endorsing NSSI on daily surveys. 
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Figure 4. Number of NSSI occurrences for each day of the online survey portion of the 
study. 
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Figure 5a. Q-Q plot of hypothesis 1 (first test) error variances. 
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Figure 5b. Histogram of hypothesis 1 (first test) error variances.  
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Figure 5c. Scatterplot of hypothesis 1 (first test) independent variable and corresponding 
error variances. 
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Figure 6a. Q-Q plot of hypothesis one (second test) error variances. 
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Figure 6b. Histogram of hypothesis one (second test) error variances. 
 
                  
 
97 
 
 
Figure 6c. Scatterplot of hypothesis one (second test) independent variable and 
corresponding error variances. 
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Figure 7. Scatterplot of hypothesis two (first test) independent variable and 
corresponding error variances. 
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Figure 8. Scatterplot of hypothesis two (second test) independent variable and 
corresponding error variances. 
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Figure 9. Scatterplot of hypothesis three independent variable nd corresponding error 
variances. 
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Figure 10. Scatterplot of hypothesis four independent variable nd corresponding error 
variances. 
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Figure 11a. Q-Q plot of hypothesis five error variances. 
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Figure 11b. Histogram of hypothesis five error variances.  
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Figure 11c. Scatterplot of hypothesis five independent variable nd corresponding error 
variances. 
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Figure 12. Scatterplot of hypothesis six independent variable nd corresponding error 
variances. 
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Figure 13a. Q-Q plot of hypothesis seven error variances. 
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Figure 13b. Histogram of hypothesis seven error variances.  
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Figure 13c. Scatterplot of hypothesis seven independent variable nd corresponding 
error variances. 
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Figure 14. Scatterplot of hypothesis eight independent variable nd corresponding error 
variances. 
